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I. INTRODUCTION & THESIS

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have been the principle tools
of war, internal conflict, genocide, and other human rights (HR)
violations.' In the wrong hands, SALW can be the instruments of terrorism,
oppression, and the means to commit violations of both Human Rights
Law (HRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).2 They can intensify
national and regional instability, prolong armed conflicts and serve as an
obstacle to post-conflict reconstruction.' In spite of the nexus between
SALW and the threat they may pose to human security, international
efforts to establish tighter controls improving the monitoring and
regulation of the arms trade and to hold states responsible via the
development of international law has been slow, weak, and ineffectual.4
1. Paul Eavis, SALW in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region: Challenges and the
Way Forward,9 WATSON INST. 251 (2002), available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/
archive/9.1/SmallArms/Eavis.pdf; see also Amnesty Int'l, Dead on Time-Arms Transportation,
Brokering,and the Threat to Human Rights, Al Index ACT 30/008/2006, May 10, 2006, available
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact300082006; CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE,
BRIEFING PAPER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL:
OBLIGATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2006), availableat http://www.hdcentre.org/
files/International law and smal arms.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Human Rights
Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37
(June 21,2004) (preparedby Barbara Frey) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on the Preventionof
Human Rights Violations Committed with Arms and Light Weapons].
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL, supra note 1,
at 3; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), UnregulatedArms Availability, SmallArms & Light
Weapons, and the U.N. Process, May 26, 2006, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/small-arms-paper-250506; Alexandra Boivin, Complicity and Beyond:
InternationalLaw and the Transferof Small Arms andLight Weapons, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
467, 467 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
review-859-p467/$File/irrc 859 Boivin.pdf.
3. See Boivin, supra note 2, at 467; see generally Jessica Howard, Invoking State
Responsibilityfor Aiding the Commission of InternationalCrimes-Australia,the UnitedStates
and the Question of East Timor, 2 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
4. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 58-60; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.N: "PROGRAM OF
INACTION" ON SMALL ARMS (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2001/07/19/global308.htm; Susan Waltz, US. Policy on Small Arms Transfers: A Human
Rights Perspective 2 (Gerald R. Ford School of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 43, 2007),
availableat http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working/2007/43-waltz-2007_rev.pdf; seealso Lema K.
Yanik, Guns and Human Rights: Major Powers, Global Arms Transfers, and Human Rights
Violations, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 357, 386-88 (2006); Arms Exports Pledge'Worthless,' BBC NEWS,
May 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/politics/3723085.stm (quoting the
United Kingdom's Joint Commons committee on defense exports stating end-user certificates aimed
at preventing the misuse of exported SALW lacked "legal or political backbone").
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The threat posed to human security by the lack of regulation and the
limited means for holding states responsible for SALW transfers is
exacerbated by globalization, rapid development of affordable
technologies, and an arms market increasingly characterized by a complex
web of private actors and transport networks.5
Weak international regulation and enforcement mechanisms regarding
the export/transfer of SALW is primarily due to a lack of political will, the
influence of commercial interests, and perceived geo-strategic concerns.6
It is no coincidence that the states with the greatest influence to effect real
change in the way in which SALW transfers are regulated and the means
by which states are held responsible for them are the very same states that
raise the loudest objections to and stand as the greatest obstacle toward the
development of effective and uniform international standards for the
transfer of SALW.7 It is also not happenstance that these are the very same
states that produce and export the greatest percentage of the world's
SALW.'
Given this apparent conflict of interest, it should come as no surprise
that the United States, the world's largest exporter of SALW,9 is opposed
to the proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). l° The ATT applies existing
obligations under international law and applies them to SALW transfer
decisions and would prohibit SALW transfers where the authorizing state
knows or has reason to know that the weapons will be used to commit
genocide, crimes against humanity, serious HR abuses, or serious

5. Neil Cooper, What's the Point of Arms Transfer Controls?, 27 CONTEMP. SEC. POL'Y
118, 118-19 (2006).
6. Id. at 123; see also Rachel Stohl, U.S. Small Arms and Global TransferPrinciples 1-4
(Project Ploughshares, Working Paper No. 06-1,2006), availableat http://www.smallarmssurvey.
org/files/portal/spotlight/country/amerpdf/americas-US-2006-b.pdf; RACHEL STOHL, CTR. FOR
DEFENSE INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER AN ARMS TRADE TREATY-U.S. OPPOSES

2 (2006), available at http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfin?documentid=3724&program
ID=73&from-page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfin; U.N. ECOSOC, Sub.-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Final Report Submitted by BarbaraFrey, Special
Rapporteur in Accordance with Sub.-Comm 'n Resolution 2002/25: Prevention of Human Rights
Violations Committed with SmallArms andLight Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub. 1/58/27 (July
27,2006) [hereinafterFinalReport Submitted by BarbaraFrey];Waltz, supra note 4, at 15; Thom
Shanker, US. is Top Arms Sellerto Developing World,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2007, at A6, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01l/us/01weapons.html?_r-l &hp&oref-slogin.
7. Cooper, supra note 5, at 122.
8. Id.; Shanker, supra note 6; see also Yanik, supra note 4, at 361-62.
9. Yanik, supranote 4, at 362.
10. Stohl, supra note 6, at 5-6.
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violations of 114L." The United States responds to such criticisms by
pointing out that its SALW policy stands as a global "model" to be
emulated and that it has initiated and participated in efforts to enhance
arms export standards predicated on its superpower status.' 2 However, U.S.
opposition to the proposed ATT not only contradicts its "official position"
on SALW transfers, but also, it fails to acknowledge its "unofficial," covert
SALW transfers which bypass arms export control regimes and undermine
national and international SALW transfer policies. 3
As of October 2007, 153 states voted in favor of the ATT Resolution
indicating that a majority of states agree that it is desirable to have
common international standards for the import, export, and transfer of
SALW. 4 However, international efforts to regulate SALW, absent support
from the world's leading SALW producers/exporters, is illustrative of the
lack of political will to develop meaningful international controls and to
enforce those that have been developed.15 If the international community
hopes to obtain the support and leadership of the United States and the
other leading state producers/exporters of SALW, such initiatives will have
to: expand on what these states are already doing; serve their respective
state interests; link such initiatives to terrorism and states' anti-terrorism
objectives; and allow for cost-effective compliance while simultaneously
providing adequate economic disincentives for noncompliance.16
Any international SALW regulatory regime that fails to include these
criteria will simply perpetuate existing tokenistic measures to provide
uniform, international standards for regulating SALW transfers. 7
Providing adequate economic disincentives where the
exporting/transferring state knows or has reason to know that more likely
than not those weapons will be used to commit human rights violations or

11. Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers art. 4, May 25, 2004,
availableat http://www.iansa.org/documents/2004/ att_0504.pdf.
12. Waltz, supra note 4, at 5-11.
13. Id. at 3-4.
14. Sarah Parker, Analysis of States' Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, U.N. Institute for
Disarmament Research, Oct. 2007, at 14, availableathttp://www.unidir.org/pd/ouvrages/pdf- 1-929045-008-A-en.pdf.
15. See In-Depth: Guns Out of Control:The ContinuingThreatofSmallArms, Humanitarian
News and Analysis, U.N. Offrice for Coodination of Humanitarian Affairs, June 28,2008, available
athttp://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?Indepthld=8 &Reportld=58952 ; Andrew McLean,
Small Arms-Big Challenge: Can Southern Africa Show the Wayfor the 2001 U.N. Conference?,
9 AFR. SECURITY REV. (2000), availableat http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ ASR/9No2/Mcclean.html;
Cooper, supra note 5, at 119.
16. See Stohl, supra note 6, at 7.
17. Cooper, supra note 5, at 118-19.
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other internationally wrongful acts will require the international
community to address limitations within the International Law
Commission's (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) regarding the rules for
establishing state complicity and impugning compensation to assisting
states. 18
Re-assessing certain aspects of the Articles will allow the international
community to establish clear lines of responsibility for states assisting
another state to commit international wrongful acts with SALW in a global
arms market that is becoming exponentially more complex. The author will
illustrate the need for the abovementioned changes by offering the reader
an in-depth analysis of the Commentary to Article 1619 and how its "intent"
requirement unduly limits state responsibility.
It is the author's contention that the most practical and effective way to
induce states to implement effective controls of exports/transfers of SALW
in advance, is by enhancing economic disincentives vis-4-vis holding states
responsible for aiding and assisting international wrongful acts committed
with SALW where states know or have reason to know that, more likely
than not, those weapons will be used to commit HR violations or other
internationally wrongful acts.
Part I will set out the parameters and the thesis of this Article. Part II
will provide an overview of relevant International Law regarding the
export/transfer of SALW transfers. The overview will include a brief
discussion of non-binding measures and binding prohibitions under
international treaty and customary law norms within the U.N. Charter,
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, IIHL, and IHR. The author will devote
most of this section to illustrate the lack of clarity regarding certain IHR
principles and how they limit the international community's ability to hold
states responsible for human rights violations committed with SALW when
those states know or have reason to know that more likely than not those
weapons will be used to commit human rights violations or other
internationally wrongful acts.
Part Ell provides a critical analysis of the ILC's view of Article 16's20
criteria for establishing state complicity for exporting/transferring states of
SALW. The author argues that the Commentary's "intent" requirement is
misguided and should the ILC fail to revisit the issue, the regional human

18. Report ofthe International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Sept. 28, 2001).
19. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty Third Session,
supra note 18, art. 16.
20. Id.
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rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies should-under these specific
circumstances-exercise their discretion and set aside the "intent"
requirement since the plain language of the Article comes into direct
conflict with the Commentary regarding its meaning and the Articles'
intent-neutral paradigm. This section also critically analyses the ILC's
position that where the wrongful act would have clearly occurred even in
the absence of that state's "aid or assistance," no responsibility to
compensate will be impugned to the assisting state. The author contends
that this position vitiates the Article's purpose.
Lastly, the author will conclude in Part IV that the most effective way
to induce states to implement effective, universal controls over SALW
transfers in advance, is to hold them responsible for aiding or assisting in
the commission of HR violations or other internationally wrongful acts. It
is conceded that the law cannot solve all problems but the international
community should maximize the law's capacity to effectively stem the
flow of SALW to end-users who are known or are more likely than not to
use SALW to commit HR violations or other internationally wrongful acts.
It is also conceded that as long as SALW are in high demand, there will
always be a black market willing and ready to try and supplant reduced
supplies of SALW resulting from extended state responsibility and stricter
state export/transfer controls. However, where demand is high and supplies
are reduced, the cost of illicit SALW will exponentially increase making
it less affordable for violating states and non-state actors to acquire SALW
through illicit means.
For the purposes of this Article only, responsibility for wrongful acts
committed with SALW is limited to states and the rules governing their
exportation/transfer. It does not include limitations imposed by national
laws or issues related to the lawfulness of stockpiling or producing such
weapons. This Article will address state responsibility for state-to-state
transfers and transfers from state-to-non-state actors. It will not discuss
issues regarding individual criminal responsibility under international
criminal law or deal with situations of occupation. Additionally, the author
uses the terms "exporting state" to mean any state that exports or
authorizes the export of SALW. "Transferring state" shall mean any state
that either exports or knowingly allows its territory (land, sea, or airspace)
to be used for the transfer of SALW.
The central issues of this Article are: 1) What are states' international
obligations with regards to exporting/transferring SALW to end-users who
are outside of their national territory that are not situations of occupation;
and 2) what is the scope of those obligations? To answer these issues one
must answer these following questions: What HR are jus cogens norms?
If a right is not ajus cogens norm, is the right part of customary law? If the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss1/4

6

DiPerna: Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity With a View toward Exten

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: COMPLICITY 'WITH A VIEW"

right is a part of customary law, does it give rise to obligations erga
omnes? If so, do the state's obligations come within their negative
obligation not to facilitate a violation of the right?
If a state's obligations come within their negative obligations, does the
state's negative obligation to respect the right compel the
exporting/transferring state to take steps in fulfillment of its positive
obligations (due diligence) to prevent the transfer of SALW to known HR
violators or when they have reason to know that, more likely than not,
those weapons will be used to commit HR violations or other
internationally wrongful acts or as a necessary element of fulfilling its
negative obligation to respect the right? Even if the right is not deemed to
give rise to obligations erga omnes (defined as obligations toward the
international community as a whole), does the exporting/transferring
states' obligations have extraterritorial applicability? If so, what is the
scope of those obligations?
If the right does not give rise to obligations erga omnes (and
presumably not a jus cogens norm), what type of 'knowledge' must the
exporting/transferring state have in order to be complicit in violation of the
right in question? Lastly, what specific indicators can be used to determine
when actual or constructive knowledge can be imputed to the exporting or
transferring state?
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGULATING
SALW TRANSFERS
Current and emergent international laws and customary norms
regarding the export/transfer of SALW range from express prohibitions to
voluntary, non-binding regional codes ofconduct. This section will discuss
how these current standards have failed to effectively curb the flow of
SALW to end-users who commit or are known to commit a range of HR
violations and other internationally wrongful acts.2 ' Additionally, this
section will discuss weaknesses in existing international law regarding the
export/transfer of SALW and the limited means for holding states

21. U.N. ECOSOC, Sub.-Comm'n on Human Rights Decision 2001/120, The Question of
the Trade, Carryingand Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context at Human Rights
andHumanitarianNorms, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39 (May 30,2002) (preparedby Barbara
Frey); see also Amnesty Int'l & Oxfam Int'l, ShatteredLives: The Casefor Tough International
Arms Control, at 24-39, 60-66, Al Index ACT 30/001/2003, 2003, available at http://www.
controlarms.org/documents/arms-reportfull.pdf; Lara Jakes, US. Says Illegal Weapons Exports
Growing, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/1 I/AR2007101100908.html.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

responsible for assisting internationally wrongful acts when those weapons
are used to commit HR violations.
A. Non-Binding Measures
In addition to binding rules, there are a multitude of existing
non-binding measures that attempt to regulate the export and transfer of
SALW. 22 However, the problem with non-binding measures is
self-explanatory-they are non-binding. States may or may not choose to
voluntarily follow their guidance and even when they do, the measures
contain so many legal gaps and loopholes that states are often able to avoid
any real responsibility for exporting or transporting SALW.
Much has been written with regards to the content and weaknesses of
binding and non-binding measures for SALW and due to the limited
parameters of this Article, the author will not repeat or discuss them in
great detail other than to acknowledge their existence and limited value in
light of their obvious shortcomings. The author acknowledges that while
existing binding and non-binding agreements and codes of conduct
limiting or banning the export and transfer of SALW are an important body
of norms that propose development and plans of action representing
principles that could shape or become customary law, at present, they have
not been very effective at stopping or limiting the flow of SALW to
end-users that violate HR and commit other internationally wrongful acts.23
To date, there is only one agreement that completely bans transfers of
SALW creating a non-binding moratorium within ECOWAS.24 While this
and other efforts such as codes of conduct represent a new development in
the regulation of exporting and transferring SALW, as they expressly list

22. See, e.g., STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., EU CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARMS
EXPORTS (1998), available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/eucode.html; Economic
Community of West African States, Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and
Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, 21 st Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads
of State and Government, Abuja, Oct. 30-31, 1998 [hereinafter ECOWAS]; U.N. Register of
Conventional Arms, G.A. Res. 46/36L, U.N. Doc. A/47/342 (Jan. 1, 1992); Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
Additional Document entitled "Elements for Objectives Analysis and Advice Concerning
Potentially Destabilizing Accumulations of Conventional Weapons: Explanatory Note," July 12,
1996; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Principles-Organization For
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers (1993).
23. INT'L ACTION NETWORK ON SMALL ARMS (IANSA), CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL

[hereinafter
IANSA], availableat http://www.iansa.org/un/review2006/documents/english/IANSA-positionpaper-intemational-transfers.pdf.
24. ECOWAS, supra note 22.

TRANSFERS OF SMALL ARMS, WORKING GROUP POSITION PAPER ON TRANSFERS (2006)
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the circumstances under which states must refrain from doing so, they do
not impose new substantive limitations to consider in the end-user state as
a pre-condition for permitting the export or transfer to take place." The
codes typically are a collection of already existing limitations on the export
and transfer of SALW.26 Absent legally-binding standards with adequate
economic disincentives, states will continue to export and transfer SALW
to end-users who commit HR violations and other internationally wrongful
acts so long as it serves their self-interests without any real cost to
themselves.
B. Binding Limitations on SAL W Transfers
1. U.N. Charter & Customary Law: Prohibitions On the Use of Force &
Principle of Non-Intervention
A state's inherent right to self-defense against an armed attack is a
long-standing principle of customary international law and articulated in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.27 Consequently, states claim that they have
a corresponding right both to acquire the means of self-defense and to
transfer them to other states as an exercise of their right to individual and
collective self-defense.2" Hence, states rationalize that they are motivated
to engage in the international trade in SALW premised on geo-strategic,
national security interests and the right of states to acquire the means of

25. IANSA, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. U.N. Charter, art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if [an] armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
... "); see also The Caroline Case (1837) 2 Moore 409 (articulating the customary law standard on
necessity and proportionality triggering a state's inherent right of self-defense where the use of
force is necessary to avert a threat that is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment of deliberation" and that the amount of force used is no more than necessary to achieve
those ends).
28. Michael Crowley & Elizabeth Clegg, Enhancing Controls on Legal Transfers, SETON
HALLJ. DIPL. & INT'LREL. 51,53 (2001), at 53, availableathttp://diplomacy.shu.edu/joumal/new/
pdf/VolIINo2/shj3.pdf; DAVID CAPIE, CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, ARMED GROUPS,
WEAPONS AVAILABILIY AND MISUSE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AcTION 11

(2004) (showing that the United States maintains that the right to transfer weapons to non-state
actors should be preserved as an instrument of foreign policy), availableat http://www.hdcentre.
org/publications/armed-groupsweapons-avaiabiity-and-misuse-overview-issues-and-optionsaction.
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self-defense. 29 However, the right of states to individual and collective
self-defense is not unlimited.3"
As with all rights, there are also corresponding duties, and the right to
export/transfer SALW as a means of self-defense is subject to limitations
that flow from the prohibition on the threat or use of force.31 The principle
of non-intervention is based on the right of every sovereign state to
conduct its affairs without outside interference as expressed in both
Articles 2(4) and Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter and reiterated in the
Declaration on Friendly Relations.3 2 The principle of non-intervention

29. CAPIE, supra note 28; see also Stohl, supra note 6, at 1-2.
30. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 C.T.S. 297; Declaration Concerning the
Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouvear Recueil (Ser. 2)
1002, 187 Consol. T.S. 459; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling or Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1072, 26
U.S.T.S. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on the Prohibition on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may Deemed to be Considered Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.95/15; Convention on Certain Chemical
Weapons, Oct. 10, 1993 (CCW) (eliminating the possibility of developing, producing, using,
stockpiling or transferring chemical weapons and Protocols I-V banning development, production,
use and stockpiling of Non-Detectable Fragments; Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices;
Incendiary Weapons; Blinding Lasers; and Explosive Remnants of War); Convention on the
Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, G.A. Res. 52/38, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 86, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177.
31. See, e.g., IADHR, O.A.S. Res. XXX, ch. 1, adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States (1948), reprintedin Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights
in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992); U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"); see also Repertory of Practice of U.N.
Organs (1945-1954); Repertory of Practice of U.N. Organs Supps. No. 1-9 (1954-1999), Vol. I-IlI,
Article 51 (emphasizing Repertory of Practice of U.N. Organs supplement No.5 (1970-1978),
vol.11, art. 51, paras. 8-19, discussing Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, as well as
Article 51 in relation to proportionality).
32. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 & 7; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
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includes not only a prohibition on the "threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political stability of another state," but also, includes
a duty for states to refrain from "organizing or encouraging the
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another [s]tate" and to refrain from
"organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another [s]tate or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts...""
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that the principle of
non-intervention was binding on all states as customary international law
in Nicardgua.34 The Court held that while U.S. activities regarding the
financing, organizing, training, and the provision of weapons to a
NicarAguan rebel group (contras) did not rise to the level of an armed
attack, these activities were held to have been an unlawful intervention in
the internal affairs of Nicarigua." The Court added that intervention is
unlawful when states use methods of coercion, particularly force, either in
the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support for
subversive activities in another State.36 Support in the instant case included
the U.S. supplying SALW to the contras.3 7
While there is no international prohibition on providing SALW to
support a requesting state's efforts to quell domestic unrest, there are
limitations on state intervention in cases where the conflict is a civil war
and the intervening state is supplying SALW to both sides of the conflict
but would not be a violation of the principle of non-intervention where
states are exporting/transferring SALW to non-state groups where the
conflict is deemed as a legitimate exercise of their right to
self-determination.38 However, provision of weapons to an opposition
group or other non-state actors outside the context of the right to

present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
33. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 32.
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
(June 27).
35. Id.
36. Id. 202-209.
37. Id. 1 195.

227-238

38. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: ALEGALREAPPRAISAL,

171-72 (1995); JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 48 (1st ed. 2001); Karl Doehring,
Self-Determination,in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 70 (Bruno Simma
ed., 1994); see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).
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self-determination would constitute a violation of the prohibition on
intervention in the domestic affairs of states as in the case of the U.S.
intervention in Nicarigua.
Thus, if a state exports or transfers SALW, and it either knows, or has
reason to know, that more likely than not those weapons will be used to
threaten or use force against the territorial sovereignty or political integrity
of the receiving state or a third state, then the exporting/transferring state
would most likely be in violation of their obligation not to use force in
another state or the principle of non-intervention depending on the factual
situation of each case.39 However, as evidenced by the unlawful
intervention by the United States in Nicardgua, the ability of the
international community to prevent or hold states accountable for such
violations is limited to diplomatic protest, international
condemnation-rarely in the form of ICJ judgments-and the imposition
of U.N. sanctions.
Unfortunately, even these few available mechanisms of accountability
are limited since most of the major state producers/exporters of SALW are
also the states comprising the permanent membership of the U.N. Security
Council who can obstruct or avoid accountability by virtue of their ability
to veto such measures.40 Thus, enforcement tends to be selective and
arbitrary based on Security Council Member States' geo-strategic, political,
and economic self-interests in spite of their primary responsibility under
the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and security.4'
2. Express Prohibitions
a. U.N. Embargoes
Other limitations on the transfer of SALW include express prohibitions
vis-A-vis embargoes imposed by the Security Council. Operating under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council may impose and
239-249, 292(3) & 292(4); Declaration on
39. Nicar. v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
Friendly Relations, supra note 32 (binding on all states as customary law); East Timor (Port. v.
Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 357, 130.
40. See Javier Alcalde & Caroline Bouchard, Human Security and Coherence Within the EU:
The Case of 2006 U.N. Small Arms Conference, 3 HAMBURG REV. Soc. SCI. 150 n.9 (2008),
available at http://www.hamburg-review.com/fileadmin/pdfO3_ 01/FAlcalde_02. pdf; SMALL
ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RiSK 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Veto of 1979, S.C. Res. 558, U.N. Doe. S/RES/558 (Dec. 13, 1984)
(strengthening the 1977 arms embargo against apartheid government in South Africa. The United
Kingdom and the United States repeatedly exercised their veto to prevent effective sanctions against
South Africa); U.S. Veto of S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/Res/487 (June 19, 1981).
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enforce binding prohibitions on Member States regarding the transfer of
SALW to specific states or regions known as "recipient specific"
prohibitions.42 Article 41 of the Charter imposes a legal obligation on
Member States to abide by embargoes enacted by the Security Council and
a duty to implement measures to ensure that persons within their
jurisdiction comply with the embargoes.43
The Security Council has increasingly made use of embargoes on the
transfer of SALW in situations deemed as threats or actual breaches to
international peace and security.' These types of embargoes have been
imposed on states found to be violating international law and at times
extended to neighboring states in an effort to stop or stem the flow of
SALW to the violating state.45 However, many states escape the imposition
of SALW embargoes where either armed conflicts or grave breaches of
human rights are taking place due to either neglect or the conflicts of
interest of Security Council Member States.46
Between 1990 and 2001, there were only eight arms embargoes in place
(one of which was voluntary), even though there were fifty-seven major
armed conflicts taking place during that same period. 47 Even where such
embargoes were imposed, attempts to curtail the flow of SALW to those
states ranged from poor to non-existent.4" While U.N. embargoes may
somewhat increase the costs and difficulty of the acquisition of SALW,
they can still be relatively easily obtained for the following reasons:
accessibility of SALW via the black market due to the increasing
sophistication of the illicit arms trade; the lag time between enacting
embargoes and lack ofmeans for monitoring compliance; lack of resources
or capacity to monitor their implementation; the existence of greater
financial incentive to breach, rather than comply with embargoes; the risk
42. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51; EMANUELA GILLARD, LAUTERPACHT RESEARCH CTR. FOR
INT'L LAW, CAMBRIDGE, WHAT IS LEGAL? WHAT IS ILLEGAL? LIMITATIONS ON TRANSFERS OF SMALL

ARMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at http://www.armstradetreaty.com/att/what.is.

legal.what.is.illegal.pdf. *Note: the author is aware that unilateral and multi-lateral embargoes may
be imposed (e.g., European Union) but for the sake of brevity this Article will only refer to
embargoes imposed by the U.N. Security Council.
43. U.N. Charter art. 41.
44. GILLARD, supra note 42, at 2-3.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Cooper, supra note 5, at 121; Amnesty Int'l, U.N. Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the
Last Ten Years: Briefing from the Control Arms Campaign: Amnesty International, Oxfam
International and International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Al Index IOR
40/007/2006, Mar. 16, 2006, availableat http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang+e&id=
ENGIOR40007206.
47. Cooper, supra note 5, at 119.
48. Id.
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of detection is too low while the consequences of breach are too weak;
impunity for illicit traffickers and noncompliant states; and the selective
and arbitrary imposition of embargoes in lieu of universal and impartial
SALW export/transfer controls.49
For example, a 2002 Dutch report on the massacre at Srebrenica
showed that during the 1990s, covert SALW supplies to
Bosnia-Hersegovina involved the use of the U.S. Air Force and possibly
U.S. Special Forces.5" Unidentified states flew Hercules C-130 cargo
planes carrying ammunition, machine guns, Stinger missiles, and other
SALW on "black flights" to Tuzla that were clearly blatant violations of
an U.N. arms embargo.51 While it has never been proven which state's
pilots flew the planes in question, the success of those flights required the
aversion of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) surveillance
under U.S. control.52 This is but one example illustrating the difficulties of
enforcing embargoes, monitoring compliance, identifying which states are
guilty of noncompliance, and punishing noncompliant states.
b. International Humanitarian Law
As noted previously, states' inherent right of self-defense is not
unlimited. There are also limitations on the means and methods ofwarfare,
and restrictions typically are express prohibitions via treaty and customary
law that proscribe the use and transfer of SALW.53 While some of the
conventions expressly proscribe prohibitions on the transfer of certain
SALW, others are silent on the issue of transfer.54 However, some argue
that silence should not be construed as permissiveness as the most recent
conventions expressly prohibit both use and transfer of certain SALW.55
Arguably, this could be construed as a reflection of emerging norms and
that prohibitions on certain SALW could-or some say, should-be read
into other earlier treaties.56 Some scholars also claim that such a conclusion
is supported by the difficulty in reconciling a state's freedom to export or
transfer certain SALW, whose use is prohibited, with a state's duty to

49. See generally Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1; see also Cooper, supra note 5.
50. NETH.
INST.
FOR
WAR
DOCUMENTATION,
SREBRENICA:
A
"SAFE"
AREA-RECONSTRUCTION, BACKGROUND, CONSEQUENCES, AND ANALYSES OF THE FALL OFA SAFE

AREA, app. II, ch. 4, § 3 (2002), available at http://193.173.80.8I/srebrenica/.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 30.
GILLARD, supra note 42, at 2.
Id.
Id.
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respect the IHL encompassed in Common Article I of the four Geneva
Conventions. 7
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
stated that not only does IHL carry with it obligations to respect and ensure
the respect of Common Article I, the norms within IHL have an "absolute
character" and are of "legal interest" to every member of the international
community and as such impose obligations on all members of the
international community "as a whole" thereby imposing obligations on all
states to respect such obligations. 8 Such language by the ICTY implies
that IHL norms carry obligations erga omnes (see below) and thus may
possibly fall within a state's negative obligation to respect IHL norms.5 9
While it is not entirely clear how states are to implement the obligation to
"ensure respect" for IHL, it is clear that when serious violations of the
Geneva Conventions or of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)occur, states have a duty to
act in order to bring them to an end.6°

57. Id.; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]
(stating that "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances"); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III};
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, art. 1, 1, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (reiterating the
obligation to respect and ensure respect applies to international armed conflicts and to
non-international armed conflicts to the extent that the latter are covered by Article Three of Geneva
Conventions I-IV (Common Article III)). While non-international armed conflicts covered by
Protocol II are not explicitly covered by the obligation to respect and to ensure respect, they can
nonetheless be considered as indirectly falling within the purview of the provision, insofar as
Protocol II is merely an elaboration of Common Article III. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, art. 1, 1, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
58. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 519
(Jan. 14, 2000).
59. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33
(Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
60. Boivin, supranote 2, at 476 n.31 (quoting protocol I "[i]n situations of serious violations
of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or
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Therefore, there may be a duty for states to take positive acts in order
to fulfill their negative obligation to "ensure respect" for IHL, which could
arguably include states taking actions to prevent exporting/transferring
SALW to end-users where serious HR violations and grave breaches of
IHL are taking place.6 ' For instance, such actions could include
implementing effective licensing for the manufacture of SALW and of
persons involved with the export, import, brokering, insurance, financing
and transportation of SALW. It could also mean states have an obligation
to require effective end-user certificates before they export/transfer SALW
and to effectively investigate, prosecute, and punish persons or entities that
do not adhere to or violate laws regulating the abovementioned activities.
Grave breaches of IHL are identified in all four Geneva Conventions
and applicable in international armed conflicts: "willful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment-including biological experiments, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person... [and] extensive
destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."6
Other grave breaches as identified in Common Article 1II to the Geneva
Conventions are applicable in non-international armed conflicts: "violence
to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, torture..
. cruel and degrading treatment... [and] the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."63
Grave breaches of lIHL is a technical term referring to a limited category
of war crimes codified by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 6
Additionally, there are international conventions prohibiting the export or
transfer of SALW by any other state actors (i.e., state agents) that would

individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations
Charter"); GILLARD, supra note 42.
61. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ARMS AVAIABILITY AND THE SITUATION
OF CIVILIANS INARMED CONFLICTS, 20 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 ICRC Report].
62. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57, art. 147. See also Geneva Convention I, supra
note 57, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 57, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note
57, art. 130.
63. Geneva Convention I, supra note 57, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 57, art.
3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 57, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57, art. 3.
64. Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, art. 8, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/3
(July 17, 1998), availableat http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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rise to complicity in the crime of genocide.65 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has elaborated that there are three elements
of complicity in genocide: 1) procuring the means of genocide; 2)
knowingly aiding and abetting genocide; and 3) instigating genocide.66 The
first and second elements are of particular relevance in regard to the export
or transfer of SALW as the ICTR has explicitly linked arms transfers with
genocide.67
The obligation to "ensure respect" of IHL norms is reiterated and
codified in Article 89 of Protocol I and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) imposing duties to cooperate
and take actions which are reflected throughout various U.N. bodies and
quasi-judicial bodies.6" Imposing and enforcing arms embargoes is but one
way in which the international community seeks to curtail or stop the flow
of SALW into states or territories where HR and IHL violations are taking
place during armed conflicts.6 9 While the legal basis for such embargoes
falls outside the purview of IHL, the appearance of a positive correlation
between the imposition of arms embargoes and occurrences of serious HR
violations and grave breaches of IHL taking place during armed conflicts,
may suggest an emerging authoritative link between the availability of
SALW, serious HR violations and grave breaches of IHL-particularly in
regard to the availability of SALW and the violation of the rights of
children. 7' This historical pattern may be indicative that embargoes on
SALW under these circumstances are reflective of states' negative
obligation to "ensure respect" for IHL under Common Article I and for
Member States of the Rome Statute.7 '

65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 3(e), Jan.
12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
66. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
533-37
(Sept. 2, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, IN 393, 395
(May 15, 2003).
67. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. The court reasoned that "by procuring means, such as
weapons, instruments or any other means, used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing
that such means would get used for such a purposes." Id. 537.
68. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common Article I of the
Geneva Conventionsrevisited:ProtectingCollectiveInterests, 82 INT'LREV. RED CROSS 67,78-79
(2000) (Many of the provisions within Protocol I are binding on all states as customary
international law).
69. Boivin, supra note 2, at 476-77.
70. Id. at 478; The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representativeof the SecretaryGeneralfor Children and Armed Conflict, 57, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/60/335 (Sept. 7, 2005); 1999 ICRC Report, supranote 61, at 65.
71. Boivin, supra note 2, at 478.
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c. Terrorism
It is conceded that there is no universal definition for what constitutes
a "terrorist" or "terrorism" per se, nor will this Article attempt to define or
create an exhaustive list of what acts can be construed as "terrorist acts."
For the purposes of this Article only, the author shall use the terms
"terrorists," "terrorism," and "terrorist acts" as defined by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Financial Action
Task Force (FATF).72
The international community has a long history of attempting to stop
the flow of SALW from reaching the hands of those who will use them to
commit terrorist acts by imposing on states positive obligations to take
actions ranging from criminalizing "the manufacture, obtaining, possession
or supplying" of SALW "with a view to the commission in any country
whatsoever" of an act of terrorism73 to obligations requiring states to
refrain from "organising, instigating, assisting or participating in .

72. The FATF defines an act of terrorism as follows:
[(i)] An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of,and as defined in one
of the following treaties: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (1970), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
ofCrimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents
(1973), International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979),
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988), Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on
the Continental Shelf (1988), and the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and (ii) any other act intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any
act.
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE wITH THE FATF 40
AND THE FATF9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 85 (2008), available at http://www.

fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/I 6/54/40339628.pdfen_32250379_32236920_34295666_1_1_1
1,00.html#34295495.
73. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations Doc.
C.546.M.383.1937.V., art. 2.5 (1937), reprintedin 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICE J. 23 (1938).
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terrorist acts in another state."7 4 Similar obligations have come into force
prohibiting the export or transfer of SALW where such transfers directly
or indirectly aid or assist terrorists.75 In response to the terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.N. Security Council
enacted Resolution 1373, which demanded that all states "refrain from
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons
involved in terrorist acts... [and t]ake the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts."76 Depending on the circumstances, support
of terrorists may breach a number of Security Council Resolutions and
state obligations under treaty and customary law.77
States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used in any way
that endangers other states-including the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state.78 Secondly,
the U.N. Declaration of Friendly Relations espouses that as a general
principle of international law: "[e]very [s]tate has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in .... terrorist acts in
another [s]tate or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred
to... involve a threat or use of force. 79
These prohibitions could be read as attempts to prevent states from
knowingly acquiescing in the injurious acts of non-state actors within its
territory. 0 As a result, a state that knows or has reason to know of a
terrorist act against another state and is able to prevent the attack but fails
to do so or fails to warn the threatened state is responsible to the victim
state for the attack."
Thus, questions arise as to how to hold a state responsible for tolerating
or for passively supporting terrorism when that state allows either its state
agents or private actors within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to
transfer SALW to known terrorist groups outside of its national territory.
The question becomes more complex when both states have the ability to

74. Id.; see also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 32.
75. Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, 6, U.N. GAOR, 42nd
Sess., 73rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987). (1988).
76. S.C. Res. 1373, 2(a)-(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
77. See, e.g., supra note 72; U.N. Charter art. 25 (obligating all Member States of the United
Nations to comply with Security Council decisions).
78. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9).
79. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 32.
80. See Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th, State
Responsibility,Self Defense and OtherResponses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2004).

81. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22-23.
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control the state agents or non-state actors but engage in willful blindness
because one of those states has decided, as a matter of policy, to put its
own economic self-interests and trade relations with a friendly state above
its obligations to refrain from passively supporting terrorists and because
the terrorist group in question was "not a high priority" to the national
security interests of the state involved.82 Lastly, even if the states in
question could not prevent the SALW transfer to terrorist organizations in
advance, are the states in question in breach of their international
obligations to protect against terrorist acts or to protect against HR
violations when they fail to adequately investigate, prosecute or punish
those subject to its jurisdiction for exporting or transferring SALW to
terrorist organizations?
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a Colombian
paramilitary group involved in Colombia's civil armed conflict, was
designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State on
September 10, 2001.83 The AUC is responsible for some of Colombia's
worst massacres and notorious for committing serious HR violations
against civilians. 84 For example, on January 17, 2001, the AUC entered a
small Colombian farming village of Chengue, rounded up all of the male
civilians, and smashed their skulls with stones and sledgehammers." The
AUC depends primarily upon extortion and drug trafficking to fund its
terrorist activities and to purchase SALW. s6
Chiquita Brands International Inc., a U.S. corporation, is one of the
worlds largest and most powerful food marketing and distributing
companies in the world. 7 The corporation controls the majority of the

82. Josh Meyer, U.S. Bending Rules on Colombia Terror-Several Lawmakers Say
Multinationals thatAid Violent Groups in Returnfor ProtectionAre Not Being Prosecuted,L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 2007, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/ 2007/jul/22/nation/na-chiquita22.
83. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2007), available at

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ 2006/82738.htm; Matthew Kirdahy, U.S. Goes Bananas on
Chiquita, FORBES.COM, Mar. 8, 2007, availableat http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/03/18/
chiquita-terrorists-faces-markets-equity-cx mk 0315autofacescan0l.html; Amy Goodman,
Chiquita's Slipping Appeal, ALTERNET, Mar. 21, 2007, available at http://www.altemet.org/
story/49588.
84. Goodman, supra note 83; Phillip Robertson, The Octopus in the Cathedralof Salt, VA.
Q. REv., June-Aug. 2007, available at http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2007/fall/robertsonoctopus-cathedral-salt/.
85. Goodman, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. Kirdahy, supra note 83; Michael Jessen, Going Bananas, ALTERNET, Feb. 6, 2001,
available at http://www.altemet.org/ story/10427/.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss1/4

20

DiPerna: Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity With a View toward Exten

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: COMPLICITY "WITH A VIEW"

world's most important fruit export valued at $1.5 billion annually.8
Chiquita (formerly United Fruit Company and then United Brands) is
notorious for unlawfully intervening in Latin American affairs in order to
take over banana-growing lands by paying bribes to paramilitary groups as
protection money.89 An Organization of American States (OAS) report in
2003 found that in November of 2001, Banadex, a Chiquita subsidiary,
used one of its ships to smuggle more than 3,000 AK-47 assault rifles and
2.5 million rounds of ammunition to Colombian paramilitaries in the
Northern Uraba region. 9° At that time, the AUC was consolidating control
of the Uraba region through massacres and assassinations. 9'
The AUC and other paramilitary groups purchased the AK-47s and
ammunition from an Israeli arms merchant operating out of Panama who
in turn obtained the SALW from the Nicariguan police.92 Reportedly, the

88. Dan Ackman, Top Of The News: BananaSeller On The Brink, FORBES.COM, Jan. 17,
2001, availableat http://www.forbes. com/business/2001/01/17/0117topnews.html.
89. Id.; Jeffrey Gold, Lawsuit: Chiquita Funded Terror Groups, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19,
2007, availableathttp://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/07/19/awsuit-chiquita-fundedterrorgroups/.
90. Organization ofAmerican States, Jan. 29, 2003, Doc. OEA/Ser.GCP/doc.3687/03; Gold,
supra note 89; Robertson, supra note 84; Carol D. Leonnig, In Terrorism-Law Case, Chiquita
Points to U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 2,2007, at A01; Colombians Seek Extraditionof U.S. Banana
Executive Who Supported Death Squads, INT'L HERALD TRm., Mar. 16, 2007 [hereinafter
Colombians Seek Extradition], available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2007/03/16/america/LA-GEN-Colombia-Terrorism-Bananas.php.
91. Gold, supra note 89; OEA/Ser.GCP/doc.2687/0329 Jan. 2003; Meyer, supra note 82;
Gold, supra note 89; Robertson, supra note 84; Carol D. Leonnig, In Terrorism-Law Case,
ChiquitaPoints to U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 2,2007, at A01; ColombiansSeek Extraditionof US.
Banana Executive Who Supported Death Squads, INT'L HERALD TRtB. (AP), Mar. 16, 2007,
availableat http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/16/america/ LA-GEN-Colombia-TerrorismBananas.php.
92. Robertson, supra note 84. Robertson reported that a former, high-ranking AUC
paramilitary commander confirmed that he personally supervised the loading of cocaine onto a
Chiquita ship called the Otterloo from a Chiquita dock and the subsequent unloading of fourteen
containers of SALW from the same Chiquita ship at Chiquita docks in an apparent
drugs-for-weapons deal. This former AUC commander explained Chiquita's involvement in the
AUC's drugs-for-weapons exchanges:
"Look, for every kilo of drugs they put in, they had to pay 500,000 pesos. If you're
a drug trafficker, and I'm in control, you'd have to pay me. You have 20 kilos of
coca, or you have some other cargo, and I own that region-you understand me?
You pay me 500,000 pesos for me to ship those drugs as if they were mine, in the
boats. You understand? Chiquita's boats. That's what the Bananero Block had
going on here." Lorenzo watched the AUC load drugs onto Chiquita boats; he
knew about it because he was there when it happened. "Look, there were drugs,
and there were times that they sent drugs for weapons. They sent the kilos of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

21

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

SALW in question began as a legitimate arms trade between the
Nicaraguan National Police and a private Guatemalan arms dealership,
Grupo de Representaciones Internationales (GIR S.A.). 93 GIR S.A. offered
the police new Israeli manufactured pistols and mini-uzis in return for five
thousand surplus AK-47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition that was
later diverted to the AUC by Shimon Yelinek, an Israeli arms dealer
operating in Panama.94 Shimon Yelinek claimed to be representing the
Panamanian National Police. 95 The diversion was made possible in part by
Chiquita freighters and docks being utilized as an intricate part of the
AUC's cocaine-for-weapons exchanges that allowed the AUC to "act as a
'
contraband-freight consolidator."96
Colombian Chief Prosecutor, Mario Iguaran, indicated that the
company's top executives knew the AUC was using payoffs and illicit
97
SALW deals to fund operations against Colombian civilians and rivals,
therefore, the Colombian government is seeking extradition of the Chiquita
top executives to face criminal prosecution in Colombia. 98 Columbia's
chief prosecutor's office noted that four people already convicted in the

drugs, and from out there, those duros said we are going to send this many kilos
of drugs and I need this many rifles."
Robertson, supra note 84.
93. Organization of American States, supra note 90.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Robertson, supra note 84; Organization of American States, supra note 90.
Neither GIR S.A. nor any Nicaraguan official ever questioned the purchase order
or attempted to verify that Panama had in fact offered to buy the weapons. Yelinek
inspected the police weapons some months after the deal was made, and after
Nicaraguan authorities had given permission for the transaction. He declared them
to be unserviceable and unsatisfactory. This threatened the transaction. GIR S.A.
and the Nicaraguan Army solved the problem by arranging a swap of 5000 surplus
police AK47s for 3117 serviceable weapons in the Nicaraguan Army inventory.
GIR S.A. delivered the Israeli arms to the police and the Nicaraguan Army took
over responsibility for delivering the AK47s. Although the parameters of the
transaction changed, no new authority was requested from responsible Nicaraguan
agencies.
Organization of American States, supra note 90.
97. Meyer, supra note 82.
98. Colombians Seek Extradition,supra note 90.
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illicit SALW transfer included Banadex' s legal representative.99 Colombia
was seeking additional information from the U.S Department of Justice
(DOJ) regarding the SALW transfer.' 0 However, the situation is
complicated further by the on-going U.S.-Colombian free-trade
negotiations.' '
Thus far, the United States has refused to extradite any Chiquita
employees to Colombia, and in exercising its prosecutorial discretion, the
DOJ decided not to prosecute Chiquita executives under its national
anti-terrorism laws regarding payments the company knowingly made to
the AUC and other Colombian terrorist groups. 102 Instead, the DOJ agreed
to a plea agreement where Chiquita executives plead guilty to violating
anti-terrorism laws and merely fined the company $25 million payable over
ten years to the U.S. government. 0 3 None of the money will go to
compensate Colombian victims of HR violations or victims of the groups'
terrorist acts. "Chiquita generates $4.5 billion a year in annual revenue and
sold its Banadex subsidiary in 2004 for $43.5 million. 5
As far as can be determined, neither the United States, Guatamala,
Panama, nor Nicargigua has prosecuted anyone in connection with the
illicit SALW weapons transfer to Colombian terrorist organizations.0 6 Nor
have any of these states been held responsible for failing to effectively
investigate, prosecute, or punish those responsible for the unlawful
transfer.0 7 None of the above-mentioned states have compensated or made

99. Romero Simon, Columbia May ExtraditeChiquita Officials,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,2007,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/world/americas/19colombia.ready.html?_r=1 &
ref=-americas&oref=-slogin.
100. Id.
101. Meyer, supra note 82.
102. Carol D. Leonnig, Ex-ChiquitaExecs Won 'tFaceBribe Charges,WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2007, at A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/l 1/
AR2007091102504.html; Gold, supra note 89.
103. Leonnig, supra note 102; Simon, supra note 99; Kirdahy, supra note 83; Colombians
Seek Extradition,supra note 90.
104. Chiquita Fined 25 Million Dollarsfor Payment to Paramilitaries,AGENCY FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070917/bsafp/
uscolombiaattacks.
105. Colombian Seek Extradition, supra note 90; Chiquita Fined 25 Million Dollarsfor
Payment to Paramilitaries,AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 17, 2007; Chiquita Reports Second
Quarter2007Results, PRNewswire, Aug. 2,2007, availableathttp://www.prenewswire.co.uk/cgi/
news/release?id=204337.
106. Leonnig, supra note 102; Kirdahy, supranote 83; ColomibansSeek Extradition,supra
note 90.
107. The plea agreement and the $25 million fine were specific to Chiquita's unlawful
payments of bribes to Colombian terrorist organizations and was not an agreement not to prosecute
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reparations to any of the victims or the victim state. No information has
been found to confirm that any of these states cooperated with the
Colombian officials in its own investigation into Banadex's illicit transfer
of SALW to Colombian terrorist organizations. The U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 calls for cooperation between states to suppress terrorist
activities.'08 Unlike the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism, the Security Council Resolution does not include the phrase
"with a view" and thus does not require a showing of intent to aid or assist
terrorists or terrorist acts in order for states to be complicit in the
facilitation of terrorist activities.'09
This case illustrates the difficulties of preventing terrorists from
acquiring SALW and enforcing anti-terrorism laws regarding the
export/transfer of SALW when states choose to prioritize their own
economic self-interests at the expense of HR and anti-terrorism efforts." 0
Arguably the United States, Gutamala, Panama, and Nicargdgua are in
breach of their international anti-terrorism obligations for failing to ensure
that both state and non-state actors subject to their jurisdiction did not aid
or assist in the perpetration of terrorist acts and for failing to take measures
to prevent such acts from occurring in the territory of a third state. 1'
Additionally, Panama and the United States may be in breach of their
international obligations by failing to investigate, prosecute, and punish the
regarding illicit transfers of SALW to Colombian terrorist organizations. U.S. Department of
Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Colombia, ChiquitaBrands International,Inc., Pleads
Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay a $25
Million Fine, DOJ Press Release, Mar. 19, 2007, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/
2007/doj3 19_07.htm.
108. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 76, 3(c).
109. SC/RES/1373; see Eric Schmitt & Thorn Shanker, US. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/
washington/18terror.html?pagewanted=3&hp (quoting Rear Adm. William P. Loeffler, deputy
director of the Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction at the military's Strategic
Command, explaining that President Bush's declaration that the United States would hold "fully
accountable" any state that provides nuclear weapons to other states or non-state actors meant that
there is no distinction between terrorists who plan or carry out terrorist attacks and those who might
supply them with weapons or weapons components. It is a system of "attribution as deterrence").
110. Leonnig, supra note 90 (reporting that former U.S. Assistant Attorney General and
current Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff turned a blind eye to
Chiquita's bribery payments to Colombian terrorist organizations even though Chiquita executives
asked for his advise on whether to continue the payments. Chertoff acknowledged the choice was
"complicated" because if Chiquita stopped paying the AUC and other terrorist groups, the
corporation would have to halt its business operations in Colombia); Meyer, supranote 82 (stating
that two senior U.S. Department of Justice officials did not think that the AUC or other Colombian
terrorist groups were a "high priority" since they had not attacked U.S. interests).
111. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 76, 3.
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Israeli arms dealer and Chiquita employees(respectively) for assisting and
supporting terrorist groups by unlawfully providing them with SALW,
which were used in the furtherance of terrorist activities. It is not known
whether any of these states were aware in advance of the illicit arms deal
to determine if they unlawfully intervened in Columbia's civil war.'12 More
information is needed to make definitive determinations.
However, the United States failed to adequately punish Chiquita
employees due to prioritizing its economic interests over anti-terrorism
obligations. Even though Chiquita was fined $25 million for paying bribes
to Colombian terrorist groups, the punishment does not duly reflect the
seriousness of materially supporting the terrorist acts perpetrated against
Colombian civilians. While one cannot expect states to prevent all acts of
terrorism, when a state knows or has a reason to know that persons or
entities within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction are aiding or
assisting terrorist organizations by supplying them with SALW, it has a
duty to adequately punish those engaging in such acts.
Lastly, the United States, Nicardgua, Guatamala, and Panama may have
breached their HR obligations in the instant case. Although there is a
certain lack of clarity regarding the extraterritorial application of states'
HR obligations, this incident occurred within the region of the American
States. Thus, the United States, Guatamala, and Panama are obligated to
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights within the OAS region regardless
of the geographical location of the victims.'' 3

112. Andrd Cala, Bush, Colombia and Narco-Politics, Consortium News, Mar. 9, 2008,
availableathttp://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/030908a.html (explaining that in 1992, former
AUC leader Carlos Castafto was a leader of an undercover, paramilitary group called the Persecuted
by Pablo Escobar (Pepes) who were trained, equipped, and coordinated jointly by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, the U.S. military, Colombian intelligence services
and the Colombian, Cali drug cartel. Castafto, along with other AUC paramilitary leaders, claim that
the AUC was similarly, but discretely being aided by the DEA and the CIA).
113. See Armando Alejandre Jr. et al. v. Republic of Cuba, Case 11.589, CHR Report No.
86/99, OAS/Ser.LV/1 1.104,doc. 10 (1999).
In effect, the Commission believes it pertinent to note that, in certain
circumstances, its exercising competent authority over facts which have occurred
in an extra-territorial location not only is consonant with but is required by the
relevant provisions... the American States are obliged to respect the protected
rights of any person subject to their jurisdiction. Although this ordinarily refers to
persons who are within the territory of a State, in certain circumstances it can refer
to behavior having an extraterritorial locus, where a person is present on the
territory of one State, but is subject to the control of another State, generally
through the acts of the agents abroad of the latter State. In principle, the
investigation has no reference to the nationality of the alleged victim or his
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3. International Human Rights Law
a. Positive-Negative Obligations
States have an international obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill HR
according to norms established by treaties and customary law." 4 These
obligations can be positive or negative giving rise to both direct and
indirect responsibility depending upon whom is actually doing the harm. 5
The distinction between positive and negative obligations typically refers
to different obligations with varying scopes of applicability and the means
for giving effect to the obligation. 116 The obligation to respect is a negative
obligation and requires states to refrain from taking prohibited actions that
would interfere directly or indirectly with HR. 117 The obligation to protect
is a positive obligation and requires states to take measures that prevent

presence in a given geographical zone, but rather to whether in those specific
circumstances the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and
control.
Id. 23. The author is aware that the Inter-American Declaration is binding by virtue of OAS
membership and that it has no express jurisdictional limitations. Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-1 0/89, July 14, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) No. 10 (1989).
114. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171,6 I.L.M. 368, art. 2(1) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 2(l) Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 28, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
115. John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Human Rights
Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled
"Human Rigths Council": Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for CorporateActs, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/SRSG-report-Human-RightsCouncil-19-Feb-2007.pdf; Viljam Engstr6m, Who Is Responsiblefor CorporateHuman Rights
Violations?,ABO AKADEMI U. INST. FOR HuM. RTs., at 11 (2002), availableat http://www.abo.fi/
instut/imr/norfa/ville.pdf; see also Human Rights Comm. General Comment 16; Compiliation of
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, art. 17, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN\ \Rev.I, at 21 (1994).
116. Francoise Hampson, The ECHR and Inter-State Transfers With Risk Of Serious
Ill-Treatment-The Attempt To Overturn Chahal, July 2007, at 6 (unpublished, on file with the
author).
117. Id.
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prohibited effects such as third parties interfering with HR" 8 or by
requiring states to take specific measures of protection." 9 The positive
obligation requires states to adopt legislation or take other measures
necessary toward the full realization of HR. 20 A state will be in breach of
its international obligations if it fails to meet the abovementioned
obligations and state responsibility flows from such a breach.' 2 ' For
example, the HRC has stated that the positive obligation of ensuring
substantive rights within the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) (including the right to life) can only be fully realized if
individuals are protected from abusive actions by states and states' agents,
private persons, or entities. 2 Similarly, regional systems affirm states'
positive duties to protect against abuses by non-state actors and require
state regulation and adjudication of non-state acts.'23
A state's negative obligation to respect the right to life within the
national territory is a well-settled principle of HRL and is non-derogable
even in time of national emergency. 4 While the right is not absolute,
states must take steps to maximize protection of the right to life. These
steps include the negative obligation of the state to refrain from arbitrary
deprivation of the right to life.'25 However, states must also fulfill positive
obligations in order to fully meet their human rights obligations.'26
In terms of states' obligations with regard to SALW, maximizing
protection requires (among other things) states to train law enforcement not
to engage in arbitrary deprivations of the right to life and take measures to

118. See, e.g., X & Y v. the Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), at 23 (1985) (judgment).
119. Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998).
120. See U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., COMM. ON ECON., SOC., AND
CULTURAL RTS., CESR, General Comments 3: The Natureof States PartiesObligations, 2 & 3,

U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, (July 29, 1988); Soc. & Econ. Rts. Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rts. v. Nigeria, Comm.
No. 155/96, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (Affr. Comm'n Hum. & People's Rts. Oct. 27,
2001).
121. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONALLAWCOMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 16
(2002).
122. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31, Nature of the GeneralLegal Obligation
on States Partiesto the Covenant, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. I/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004).
123. See generally Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors ch. 9
(2006); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 120, at 173 (establishing the due diligence test);
Osman v. United Kingdom, EctHR (Oct. 29, 1998), Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1998VIII.
124. ICCPR, supra note 114, arts. 6 & 4(2); ECHR Charter art. 2; ACHR Charter art. 4;
UDHR art. 6; ACHPR art. 4; OHCHR General Comment 6.
125. FinalReport Submitted by BarbaraFrey, supra note 6, at 2.
126. Id.
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minimize violence between private actors by enacting legislation
criminalizing violent acts with SALW.127 However, minimizing violence
between non-state actors with SALW includes a states' positive obligation
to exercise due diligence exceeding the mere criminalization of violent
acts. 2 ' In other words, to meet their negative obligation to respect HR,
states should take positive actions against reasonably foreseeable harm.'29
The Human Rights Committee has stated that a state is incapable of
meeting its HR obligations by merely doing nothing at all. 3 ° If the
international community wishes to have effective rather than illusory
realization of HR, then states must come to terms with the fact that HR
cannot be fully realized merely through negative obligations alone
regarding the export or transfer of SALW. The negative obligations should
be supported by positive obligations requiring states do certain things to
prevent foreseeable harm. 3 '
At present, a state's positive and negative obligations regarding the
export and transfer of SALW are determined and limited by the nature of
the HR(s) at risk since a state's obligations with respect to those rights are
set forth within relevant treaties and customary law. 3 2 The scope of those
obligations is subject to the interpretation of regional and extra-judicial
treaty bodies. The question of whether states can be held responsible for
exporting/transferring SALW to end-users that are known human rights
violators or where it is more likely than not that SALW will be used violate
HR may depend upon several factors.
First, exporting/transferring state responsibility may depend on whether
the exportation/transfer of SALW under the circumstances is deemed to be
a breach of the exporting/transferring state's positive obligations to protect
and fulfill or the exporting/transferring state's negative obligation to

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8; Jiminez Vaca v. Columbia, HRC Communication No. 859/1999 9.
130. See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1979) (holding that while Article
8 of the ECHR is essentially concerned with the state's negative obligation to refrain from arbitrary
interference by public authorities, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective
"respect" for family life).
131. See, e.g., Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
states: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." On the scope of Article 6, see Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 6: The Right to Life, Apr. 30, 1982, 5, U.N. Doc.
HRIIGEN/l/Rev.6 of May 12, 2003, at 128 (stating "the right to life has been too often narrowly
interpreted... The expression 'inherent right to life' cannot properly be understood in a restrictive
manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures..
132. See, e.g., UDHR, art. 28; ICCPR, art. 2(1); ICESCR, art. 2(1).
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respect human rights. Secondly, the responsibility of the
exporting/transferring state may also depend upon which of the victim's
rights were violated or the likelihood of a violation by the end-user (i.e.,
jus cogens norm such as torture v. other HR). Lastly, the responsibility of
the exporting or transferring state may depend on the extraterritorial
applicability of the exporting/transferring state's HR obligations.
b. Jurisdiction
Issues regarding the extraterritorial application of HR outside the
national territory in general and with regards to SALW transfers in
particular are the subjects of much debate. Arguably, one could assert that
states are in breach of their HR obligations for failing to exercise due
diligence when they export/transfer SALW to states where the
exporting/transferring state knows, or has reason to know that more likely
than not SALW will be used to commit HR violations.' 33 Whether states
are obligated to exercise such due diligence in order to fulfill HR
obligations extraterritorially is unclear particularly in situations that neither
situations of detention or occupation.
The scope of human rights under international treaties is typically
limited to those who are either within the state party's territory or subject
to its jurisdiction.'34 The scope of a state's due diligence obligation to
ensure HR outside the exporting or transferring state's territory depends on
the international rule of reasonableness'35 and the degree of control the
state has over such exports/transfers of SALW. 36 However, recognizing

133. See generally Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations
Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, supra note 1.
134. ICCPR art. 2 (while Article 2 of the ICCPR refers to all individuals within a state's
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted these to be
independent ground for application of the Covenant); ECHR charter art. 1; see, e.g., Delia Saldias
de Lopez v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 52/1979 (July 29, 1981), U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/OP/1, at 88
(1984); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Req. for Advisory op.) (Order of Dec. 19, 2003).
135. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
136. See Ruggie, supra note 115; see generallyInternationalLaw Commission'sArticles on
State Responsibilityfor Internationally Wrongful Acts, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES (James Crawford ed. 2002)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY]; Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Merits, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24); Prosecutor
v. Tadic, 1999 Case No. IT-94-1I, Summary of Appeals Chamber Judgment (July 15, 1999);
Application of the convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
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the extraterritorial application of HR and corresponding due diligence
obligations of exporting/transferring states of SALW does not infringe
upon the principle of state sovereignty because such obligations focuses on
the effects of the actions or inactions of exporting/transferring states rather
than the actions of the state of the victim. 137
Additionally, some of the substantive norms set forth within certain
treaties have evolved into customary international law and binding on all
states. As such, they should be respected, protected, and ensured both
within and outside national territories based upon the principles of the
universality ofhuman rights and non-discrimination. 38 Enumerating which
rights have evolved into customary law has been the subject of much
discussion among academics and it is neither useful nor practical to
attempt to provide an exhaustive list here. However, some, if not all, of the
rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
such as: the right to life; prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; principles of non-discrimination; and
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention are arguably part of
customary law.' 39
Admittedly, the UDHR was never intended to be a legally binding
instrument, but it is fair to say that some, if not most of the rights contained
therein, have evolved over time to become general principles or customary
international law and as such are binding on all states evidenced not only
by opino juris and state practice but also by the large number of states who
have signed or ratified the core treaty bodies espousing the rights contained
within the UDHR.'40 As customary HRL develops over time, assertions

& Herz. v. Yugo.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. (Feb. 24), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/91/7/99.pdf.
137. See Ruggie, supra note 115.
138. See generally SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, The Nature of CustomaryLaw Obligations,in BEYOND
NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES' HUMAN RIGHTS OBUGATIONS IN INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 118

(2006) [hereinafter BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS].
139. Id; Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS-THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114-15 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981); Ashlid Samnoy, The Originsof the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, in
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 10

(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbiom Eide eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION].
140. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
Samnoy, The Origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION, supra note 139. The "inherent right to life" is not only enumerated in the UDHR
but also in the following treaty bodies and have garnered a high rate of state participation. UDHR
art. 6; ICCPR art. 6; ECHR Charter, art. 2; IACHR Charter, art. 4; ACHPR Charter, art. 4.
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that states' HR duties and obligations stop at the water's edge are
correspondingly weakened. 141
While there has recently been some normative convergence regarding
states' extraterritorial HR obligations, the enthusiastic approach of the
IACtHR remains in sharp contrast to the cautious methodology of the
ECtHR. 142 Nevertheless, it would seem incredible that a state has no HR
obligations regarding the export/transfer of SALW to those outside their
territory when they know or have reason to know that more likely than not
those weapons will be used to violate HR of persons outside their national
territory or subject to their jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise flies in the
face of the principles of the universality of HR and non-discrimination and
would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that states have no duties or
responsibilities for the effects of their exporting/transferring SALW to
known state and non-state human rights violators.
Such a conclusion is even more suspect given that it would allow
exporting/transporting states to effectively act, or not act, outside its
national territory in a manner inconsistent with its obligations within its
national territory-a conclusion the HRC has previously rejected. 4 1 Lastly,
it is worth noting that neither the Inter-American Declaration of Human

141. Skogly, The Nature of Customary Law Obligations,in BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS,
supra note 138, at 131.
142. See John Cerone, The Application of Regional Human Rights Law Beyond Regional
Frontiers:The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and U.S. Activities in Iraq, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/10/insights051025.html; see Alejandre
Jr. et al., supra note 113. Butsee Bankovic v. Belgium, (Admissibility) App. No.52207/99 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2001) (construing the extraterritorial application of the ECHR narrowly the ECtHR held
NATO's bombing of a radio-television station resulting in the death of the civilians outside the
attacking states' territories was not sufficient "authority and control" over the victims to bring them
within the jurisdiction of the respondent states. However, it could be argued that the ECtHR was
only saying that the applicants could not use the ECHR machinery, rather than no human rights
violations occurred); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 16/10455.pdf.
143. Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 52/1979 (July 29, 1981), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/1, at 90 (1984) (holding that Uruguay violated its international obligations under the
ICCPR when its security forces abducted and tortured a Uruguayan citizen residing in Argentina.
The author is aware that this case meets the jurisdictional requirements set out in Bankovic since
it was a situation of detention, however, the Human Rights Committee went further stating nothing
within the ICCPR may be interpreted as a right to engage in activities aimed at destroying any rights
contained therein reasoning the unconcionability of interpreting state responsibility under Article
2 in such a way as to permit State Parties to engage in violations extraterritorially which they could
not engage in within their territory); see also ICESCR, supra note 114, art. 2 (imposing an
obligation on State Parties to take steps "individually and through international assistance and
cooperation," toward the progressive realization of the rights contained in the Covenant possibly
implying an element of extraterritorial applicability to all State Parties).
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Rights (IADHR) nor the African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights (ACHPR) has express jurisdictional limitations'" raising additional
questions regarding those Member States' extraterritorial HR obligations
regarding SALW transfers.'45
c. Due Diligence, Jus Cogens, & Obligations Erga Omnes
States also have an obligation to exercise due diligence so as not to
impair the enjoyment of HR as part of their positive obligations to protect
and fulfill HR.'46 States' due diligence obligations extend to the prevention
of HR violations committed with SALW by both state and non-state
actors.147 The nature and extent of what diligence is due for exporting or
transferring states of SALW to prevent those weapons from being used to
impair or violate HR would be determined by the "primary rules" within
the core treaty bodies which determine fault and injury creating wider
responsibility while the Articles on State Responsibility set out more
general "secondary rules"
of state responsibility and remedies for breaches
148
of the primary rules.
HRL requires states to maximize HR protection particularly with
regards tojus cogens human rights obligations and while there is some lack
of consensus as to which international norms constitute jus cogens
norms,"4 it is generally accepted that acts of aggression-threats or use of

144. The IADHR is binding vis-i-vis membership in the Organization of American States
(OAS); ACHPR Charter, art. 1 (making no reference to jurisdictional limitations).
145. It should also be noted that post Alejandre v. Cuba, the Inter-American Commission
recently rejected as inadmissible a petition that conduct of U.S. forces in Iraq violated
Inter-American human rights law without articulating its reasons for doing so although it may have
been due to the violations having occurred outside of the region of the OAS. John Cerone,
Jurisdictionand Power: The Intersection ofHuman Rights Law & the Law of Non-international
Armed Conflict in an ExtraterritorialContext, New England School of Law Working Paper Series,
Paper 2, 2007, at 32 n.90, available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l00l&
context=nesl/neslfwps; see Cerone, supra note 142.
146. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, (Ser. C) 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 4, at 4, 9 (holding that
states have a duty to "organize the governmental apparatus, and in general, all the structures
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable ofjuridically ensuring the free
and full enjoyment of human rights").
147. Final Report Submitted by Barbara Frey, supra note 6, at 2-8.
148. See generallyArticles on State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136; Daniel Bodansky et al., Symposium: the ILC's State
ResponsibilityArticles, Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773 (2002).
149. IVAN SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (1lth ed. 1994); Maria Spinedi,
InternationalCrimes of State: The LegislativeHistory[hereinafter InternationalCrimes ofState],
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 135-37 (Joseph Weiler et al. eds., 1989), Giorgio Gaja,
Obligations Erga Omnes, InternationalCrimes and Jus Cogens: A Tenative Analysis of Three
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force and the prohibitions against torture, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, piracy and slavery are jus cogens norms. 5 ' As such,
they are deemed as having a special legal character that by definition gives
rise to rights and obligations erga omnes and therefore carries with them
legal consequences not only for the violating state but also for third
states. 5 '
Not only are states prohibited from violating jus cogens norms, they
must refrain from doing anything that will facilitate the commission of a
violation.'52 However, it is important to note the distinction between
international crimes and jus cogens norms with regards to state
responsibility for the transfer of SALW. While international crimes require
evidence of breach, jus cogens norms only require evidence of a possibility
of breach to trigger state obligations to prevent them from occurring.153 As
such, jus cogens norms appear to fall within a state's negative obligations
and states may be in violation of those obligations, if they export/transfer
SALW to end-users whom they know or have reason to know that more
likely than not those weapons will be used to violate jus cogens norms.
While all jus cogens norms are deemed to give rise to states'
obligations erga omnes, not all obligations erga omnes necessarily rise to
ajus cogens norm.' 54 While disagreements exist as to whether there is an
exhaustive list of rights giving rise to obligations erga omnes,155 the ICJ in
Related Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE, supra note 149, at 156-58; see also M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes.: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (1996).
150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53 & 64, Jan. 27, 1980, 115 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679; Bassiouni, supra note 149, at 68.
151. Hampson, supra note 116, at 8; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, M 139-143 (Dec. 10, 1998); ECtHR judgment in Al Adsani v. the United
Kingdom, 35763/97,judgment ofNov. 21,2001; Prosecutorv. Delalic and others, CaseNo. IT-692 l-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 452-454 (Nov. 16, 1998); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited, Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, at 32; Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 24, Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the
Covenant or the OptionalProtocols thereto, or in relation to declarationsunder article41 of the
Covenant, Fifty-secondsession, U.N. Committee Against Torture Draft General comment No. 2,
Implementation ofArticle 2 by State Parties,38th Session, U.N. Doc. ICPR/21/Rev. l/Add.6, 1
(May 16, 2007).
152. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art. 16,
at 155-60.
153. Howard, supra note 3, at 6-11.
154. Hampson, supranote 116, at 8; Howard, supranote 3, at 7-11; Barcelona Traction, supra
note 151, at 33-34.
155. See, e.g., LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 52-55 (1988); Reparations for Injuries
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Barcelona Traction held that a distinction exists between state obligations
created through bilateral or multi-lateral agreements and obligations of
states toward the international community as a whole.156 The ICJ
elaborated that in light of the importance of the rights in question, "all
states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes" and provided four examples meeting that criteria:
acts of aggression; genocide; slavery; and racial discrimination.' 57 In an
attempt to analyze the development of obligations owed erga omnes,
Maurizio Ragazzi developed what has been described as a descriptive and
not a prescriptive formula that must be met in order for the obligation to
be deemed erga omnes. i 8 Borrowing heavily from the ICJ in Barcelona
Traction, Ragazzi's list of rights included those enumerated within that
case but mentioned the rights to life and human dignity as being
"fundamental" to the promotion of HR.'59
Thus, according to Ragazzi, only those rights espoused within
Barcelona Traction can be deemed to have obligations erga omnes with the
possible exception of adding the right to self-determination. 60 However,
since Ragazzi did not intend to create an exhaustive list of rights giving
rise to obligations erga omnes and mentions the right to life and human
dignity as being "fundamental" in the promotion of HR, it would seem odd
not to include the right to life and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment within the list of those rights giving rise to
obligations erga omnes although these rights have not yet developed into
jus cogens norms.' 6' If one accepts Ragazzi's criterion as a reflection of the
ICJ's concept of rights giving rise to obligations erga omnes, then states
may have negative obligations not to transfer SALW to end-users whom
are known or where the exporting or transferring state has reason to know
that more likely than not SALW will be used to violate a right giving rise
to erga omnes obligations.

Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) (1949) ICJ Rep 1, 181-182. But
see Barcelona Traction, supra note 151 at 33-34.
156. Barcelona Traction, supra note 151.
157. Id. at 33-34. (emphasis added).
158. MAuRIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 134
(1997), cited in Howard, supra note 3, at 8-9.
159. Id. at 132-34.
160. Id. at 9.
161. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, 182 (Mar. 3, 2000)
(defining "violence to life and person" as "a broad offence which, at first glance, encompasses
murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture and which is accordingly defined by the cumulation
of the elements of these specific offences").
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d. State Obligations & Causation of Harm
Even if one presumes all of states' HR obligations are applicable
extraterritorially for the purposes of this Article, the issue of establishing
a direct causational link between the exporting/transferring of SALW, and
the harm suffered by the victim in the receiving state has historically stood
as an obstacle toward holding exporting/transferring states responsible for
HR violations that occur outside of the exporting/transferring state's
territory even when the exporting or transferring state failed to adequately
regulate such transfers. 62 Comparisons have been made between states'
obligations regarding the exportation/transfer of SALW with states'63
obligations of non-refoulement under International Refugee Law (RL).1
It has been argued that making such analogies between states' obligations
regarding non-refoulement and states' obligations regarding
exporting/transferring SALW is flawed due to a distinct difference in64 the
causational link between the state's conduct and the victim's harm.
It is asserted that the causational distinction turns on the notion that the
act of returning a person to another state where there is a real risk of either
torture or serious ill-treatment is a sine qua non cause of the victim's
eventual harm, whereas exporting or transferring SALW either to known
human rights violators or to end-users where states have reason to know
that more likely than not SALW will be used to commit HR violations
lacks the same direct, immediate causational linkages of harm between the
victim and the exporting/transferring state of SALW.165 It has been asserted
that the export/transfer of SALW does not meet the "but for. . ." causation

test-that is "but for the export/transfer
of weapon 'X,' HR violation 'Y'
66
would not have occurred."'
For example, in Tugar v. Italy, Rasheed Tugar, an Iraqi national, filed
a complaint with the Human Rights Commission (HRCM) alleging Italy

162. See, e.g., Rasheed Tugar v. Italy, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (decision of
Oct. 18, 1995, unpublished).
163. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, GA/RES/39/46, Annex art. 4, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A139/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]; Boivin, supra note 2, at 479-81 (citing SUSAN MARKS
& ANDREW CLAPHAM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, OXFORD UNIVERSrrY PRESs 13 (Oxford,

2005)) (stating "Ifa government may not return or expel a person to a State in which his or her life
or freedom will be at risk... nor may it sanction the transfer of arms to a country in which the risk
arises of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law").
164. Boivin, supra note 2, at 479-80.
165. Id.; Rasheed Tugar, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm'n H.R.

166. See Boivin, supra note 2, at 479-80; Rasheed Tugar, infra note 167.
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failed to protect his right to life under the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR). 67 In 1993, Tugar was employed as a mine-clearer in Iraq
when he stepped on a mine resulting in the amputation of his lower-right
leg. 6 In 1982, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs contracted the
procurement of 5.75 million anti-personnel mines with an Italian company,
V.M., to be delivered when there was no Italian law regulating the
exportation of the SALW in question and the Ministry of Foreign Trade
enjoyed a wide margin of discretion in granting export licenses. 69 The
applicant argued that Italy "did not regulate the sale of anti-personnel
mines not containing any self-detonating or self-neutralising mechanism,
thus failing to secure his right to life as guaranteed by Article 2 of the
Convention."' 70 Additionally, the applicant's counsel argued that
analogous to expulsion cases such as Soering,'71 the Italian authorities had
exposed the applicant to real and foreseeable harm-namely, the risk of
"indiscriminate" use of mines by Iraq. 7 The Commission dismissed the
application reasoning that:
the applicant's injury can not be seen as a direct consequence of the
failure of the Italian authorities to legislate on arms transfers. There
is no immediate relationship between the mere supply, even if not
properly regulated, of weapons and the possible "indiscriminate"
use thereof in a third country, the latter's action constituting the
direct and73 decisive cause of the accident which the applicant
suffered.
It is conceded that there is a problem establishing that a state breached its
positive obligations to protect or to fulfill human rights by exporting or
transferring SALW because in order to do so, the victim must prove that
the exporting or transferring state is the direct proximate cause of the
victim's harm-meaning there is no other intervening cause which comes
between the original negligence of the exporting/transferring state and the

167. Rasheed Tugar, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm'n H.R., citedin OLIVIER DE SCHUTrER,
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MULTINATIONALS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW,

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE WORKING PAPER NUMBER 1, 61 n.211 (2004),

available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/wp/s04deschutter.pdf
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Soering v. U.K., Judgment, 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161.
172. Boivin, supra note 2 at 480; DE SCHUTTER, supra note 167.
173. Tugar v. Italy, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm'n on H.R. (1995).
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injured victim in another state.174 If this intervening cause (the end-user) is
the substantial reason for the injury, then the exporting or transferring state
may have reduced responsibility or no responsibility at all.' 75 The argument
follows that while the exporting or transferring state of SALW may be
negligent for failing to regulate the export or transfer of SALW, the
end-user state's negligent, tortious or criminal conduct stands as the
intervening cause (i.e., direct proximate cause) of the victim's harm.
Therefore, it is only the end-user-state who is responsible or liable for
failing to fulfill its HR obligations with regards to the injured victim within
its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from actual or foreseeable HR
violations.
Similarly, in Tugar v. Italy, the Commission asked whether the
applicant's "injury was the direct consequence" of Italy's failure to regulate
the transfer of anti-personnel mines to Iraq and whether there was an
"immediate relationship" between Italy's supplying anti-personnel mines
to Iraq and Iraq's "indiscriminate" use of those weapons. 7 6 In other words,
was there a direct causational link between Italy's failure to regulate the
export of anti-personnel mines and Iraq's subsequent misuse of those
weapons and secondly, was there a direct causational link between Italy's
failure to regulate the exportation of anti-personnel mines and the victim's
harm?
The Commission answered "no" to both questions; 7 7 however, the
issues under discussion here are distinctly broader from those in
Tugar-namely, whether a state is in violation of either its positive,
negative, or both sets of obligations when that state exports/transfers
SALW to a known HR violator or when, more likely than not, SALW will
be used to commit HR violations or other internationally wrongful acts.
Additionally, the Commission in Tugar merely sought to establish direct
responsibility and did not address issues regarding indirect state
responsibility. 78 Lastly, the Commission in Tugar merely looked to
establish the exporting state's specific positive obligation to regulate the
export of SALW with respect to the victim's right to life and did not

174. See Law.com Law Dictionary, "proximate cause," http://dictionary.law.com (last visited
Apr. 13, 2008); Law.com Law Dictionary, "intervening cause," http://dictionary.law.com (last
visited Apr. 13, 2008).
175. See supra note 174; see also Rasheed Tugar, supra note 167.
176. Rasheed Tugar, supra note 167.
177. Id.
178. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

37

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

address states' broader positive and negative obligations in relation to other
human rights.' 79
As noted above,jus cogens norms-particularly torture-have a special
legal character that carry with them special obligations. However, the
author contends that assertions of causational differences between
exposing persons to the real risk of foreseeable harm vis-A-vis states
exporting/transferring SALW to end-users where SALW are known to be
used or more likely than not those weapons will be used to violate human
rights -and exposing persons to the real risk of foreseeable harm vis-A-vis
expulsion of persons back to states where there is the same actual or
foreseeable risk that the person will be subjected to torture-is an alleged
difference without any distinction.
Resorting to the Commission's rationale in Tugar, it could be argued
that states seeking to expel persons who are at the same actual or
foreseeable risk that they will be subjected to torture-are not the direct
proximate cause of actual or foreseeable harm, but rather, the receiving
state, its agents, or non-state actors within the territory of the receiving
state is the proximate cause of actual or foreseeable harm (i.e., the
intervening cause of the victims harm). Such reasoning is equally flawed
in both instances.' First, states have both positive and negative
obligations with regards to torture and other human rights norms.
For example, states not only have a positive obligation to make acts of
torture criminal offences under its domestic law, they are also obligated to
criminalize "attempts to commit torture and... act[s] ... which constitute
[] complicity or participation in torture."'' Secondly, states have a
negative obligation to "take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable
risks of torture... by officials of other states or non-state actors."' 82 Thus,
exporting or transferring the means-in the instant case, SALW or in the
case of refoulement, a person-to a state where there is a real risk of
torture, is to facilitate the violation of a jus cogens norm.8 3 All that is
required is that the exporting or transferring state of SALW knows or has
reason to know of the real risk of torture to give rise to state responsibility

179. Id.
180. CAT, supranote 163, art. 3; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Apr.
22, 1954, availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menus/b/o_c_ref.html; Chahal v U.K., App. No.
22414/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 88 & 91 (1989); Soering v U.K., App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R.
88 & 91 (1989).
181. CAT, supra note 163, art. 4.
182. Stephanie Palmer, A Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and Proportionality, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 438, 441 (2006), cited in Hampson, supra note 116.
183. Hampson, supra note 116, at 10.
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ofthe transferring or exporting state. '' Therefore, states have an obligation
not to export or transfer SALW where there is a real risk that those
weapons will be used as a means for violating the prohibition against
torture and, as such, come within the negative obligation of a state not to
facilitate the violation. 85
In other words, the same obligations and standard of care needed for the
exporting or transferring state to avoid facilitation or being complicit in
torture may be the same with regards to the export or transfer of SALW
where there is the same actual or foreseeable risk that persons within the
receiving state or subject to its jurisdiction will be at real risk of being
subjected to violations of other jus cogens norms. As noted above, jus
cogens norms only require evidence of a possibility of breach to trigger
state obligations to prevent them from occurring. 86 As such, when there is
an actual or foreseeable risk the end-user will use SALW to violate a jus
cogens norm, there is no requirement to establish that there is no other
intervening cause between the exporting or transferring state's conduct and
the victim's harm in order to establish that the exporting or transferring
state is the sine qua non cause of the victim's harm.187 However,
distinctions seem to emerge with regards to the negative or positive
obligations of an exporting/transferring state of SALW that is relevant to
other human rights and it is not entirely clear that there is a correlative
relationship between the jus cogens prohibition of torture and the negative
obligation to respect HR.188
Determining whether states' duties for the export/transfer of SALW,
where there is an actual or real risk of HR violations (other than a violation
of a jus cogens norm), is a part of the negative obligations of exporting or89
transferring state (aside from cases of complicity) is an open question.
Prohibitions against ill-treatment and other HR violations do not appear to
have the same status or due diligence requirements as jus cogens norms
although according to Ragazzi, ill-treatment may give rise to obligations
erga omnes and thus trigger a state's negative obligations. 9 ° Additionally,
complicity needs to be determined by establishing differing degrees of

184. Id.
185. Id.; CAT, supra note 163, art. 4.
186. Howard, supra note 3, at 6-11.
187. Spinedi, supra note 149, at 7, 138 (arguing that human rights violations construed as
international crimes (i.e., violations ofjus cogens norms) are so serious that states are often obliged
to prosecute and punish such acts thereby waiving ordinary rules ofjurisdiction).
188. See Hampson, supra note 116, at 11.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 10.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

39

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

knowledge in the facilitation of international wrongful acts according to
the rules set forth in the Articles on State Responsibility. 9 '
II. COMPLICITY "WITH A VIEW" TOWARD EXTENDED
STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The Articles on State Responsibility'9 2 represent a codification and
useful starting point of departure for determining indications ofestablished
and progressively developing customary "secondary" rules ofresponsibility
and remedies to breaches of "primary" rules set forth within the core treaty
bodies.'93 The rules of the Articles on State Responsibility apply both to
acts and omissions to treaty obligations and customary norms
encompassing the entire spectrum of international law. 94 Importantly, the
"primary" rules within the treaty bodies determine fault and injury creating
wider state responsibility for state and non-state acts while the Articles on
State Responsibility set out more general "secondary" rules of state
attribution.' 95
In other words, the "secondary" rules claim to be fault-neutral whereas
the "primary" rules do not.196 The distinction is quite significant in terms
of state attribution as the "primary rules" require a showing of intent,
whereas the "secondary" rules claiming to be fault-neutral, should not
require a showing of specific intent to establish state attribution in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act. 97 However, attributing
state responsibility in terms of establishing complicity for certain
international wrongful acts appear to stand in stark contrast with the
Articles on State Responsibility proclaimed overall 'fault neutral'
paradigm. 98 Having to show the specific intent of states in order to
establish state complicity for international wrongful acts committed with

191. INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, arts. 16
&41.
192. Id.
193. Bodansky et al., supra note 148.
194. Id. at 780-81.
195. Id. at 781; United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehron (United States v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24); James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
10 EUR. J. INT'LL. 435,439 (1999).
196. Crawford, supra note 195, at 81 3 & 84 10.
197. Id.
198. Hampson, supra note 116, at 8-11 (explaining that certain human rights, such as serious
ill-treatment, do not have the same status ofjus cogens norms and therefore Article 16 may require
a showing of intent by assisting states in order to establish their complicity in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss1/4

40

DiPerna: Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity With a View toward Exten

2008]

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: COMPLICITY "'WITHA VIEW"

SALW creates an unnecessarily high threshold for attributing state
responsibility when those weapons are then used to commit certain HR
violations or other internationally wrongful acts by end-user states.
Efforts to regulate SALW are meant to prevent weapons from being
exported/transferred to end-users where it is either known or where it is
more likely than not that they will be used to commit HR violations or
other internationally wrongful acts. The primary concept at the heart of the
issue is that of complicity.1 99 The Articles on State Responsibility represent
the international community's first attempt to codify this concept.2 "° As a
result, limitations can be imposed on what would otherwise be deemed
lawful export or transfers of SALW.2°'
A. Article 16
Article 16 reads as follows:
A state which aids or assists another [s]tate in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally
responsible for doing so if: (a) that [s]tate does so with the
knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act;
and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by
that [s]tate.2 °2
Reading the plain language of the Article there appears to be four basic
elements to establish complicity: 1) state A has committed an
internationally wrongful act; 2) state B aided or assisted state A in the
commission of that act; 3) state B had "knowledge" of the circumstance of
the act of state A; and 4) the internationally wrongful act committed by
state A would also have been an internationally wrongful act if committed
by state B.
The fundamental rules ofstatutory construction set out various tests and
methods used by courts for determining the meaning of a given law. A
court should turn to one cardinal cannon before all others: Courts must
presume that the drafters "say [] in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says. .. ."203 Thus, "[w]hen the words of a statute are

199. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL, supra note 1,

at 6.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supranote 136, art. 16.

Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Gernain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).
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unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last...."20" With regards to
treaty law, "The clear import oftreaty language controls unless 'application
of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects20a5
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.'
The Articles as a codification of customary law are more akin to statutory
rather than treaty law; therefore, the meaning of any particular article
contained therein should be interpreted accordingly.
The language of Article 16 is fairly straightforward with the exception
of a few ambiguous terms needing clarification as to their meaning and
scope of applicability. First, what does it mean to "aid" or assist? Secondly,
what does "knowledge" mean? Thirdly, what type and how much
knowledge must the state have before it can be deemed complicit?
Although the Commentary to Article 16 was intended to clarify the
meaning and scope of these ambiguities, unfortunately, its analysis does
not follow the basic principles of statutory construction and therefore
necessitates even further interpretation and clarification by international
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies leading to confusing and possibly
unintended results. Thus, it is submitted that certain aspects of the
Commentary need to be revised by the ILC so that they more accurately
reflect established customary law principles, the plain meaning of the
Articles' text and general principles of criminal and civil jurisprudence.
1. Aiding or Assisting
The Commentary to Article 16 defines "aiding or assisting" not by
saying what it is, but rather what it is not.20 6 The reader is instructed that
it is necessary to distinguish "aiding and assisting" of an internationally
wrongful act from "aiding and assisting" of an individual criminal act
emphasizing that one should not confuse state responsibility for "aiding
and assisting" with that of being a co-perpetrator or co-participant under
criminal law. 7 Whereas "aiding and assisting" in a criminal act implies
equal culpability of both the perpetrator of the act as well as the "aider or
abettor," the state committing the internationally wrongful act is directly
responsible but the state that "aids or assists" is only "indirectly"
responsible to the extent that its own conduct "caused or contributed" to

204.
205.
v. United
206.
207.

Id.
Sumitomo Shoji Amer., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180, (1982) (quoting Maximon
States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).
See id. and accompanying commentary.
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art. 16,
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the wrongful act.2" 8 However the Commentary adds that where the
wrongful act would have clearly occurred even in the absence of that
state's "aid or assistance," no responsibility to compensate will be
impugned to the assisting state.20 9
2. Scope of Aiding & Assisting: "Knowledge"
The Commentary limits the scope of state responsibility for "aiding and
assisting" in three ways: 1)the aiding or assisting state must be "aware" of
the circumstances making the conduct of that state internationally
wrongful; 2) the aid or assistance must be given "with a view" to
facilitating the commission of the act, and must actually do so; and 3) the
act must have been wrongful had it been committed by the assisting
state.21 °
The standard ofproof required to establish "knowledge" ofthe assisting
state is not defined anywhere throughout the Articles. 21 ' Arguably,
constructive or presumed knowledge is an appropriate standard of proof in
international law where it can be shown that under certain circumstances,
knowledge or awareness could be imputed.212 Constructive or presumed
knowledge is that which can be expected from a state exercising reasonable
care whereas objective or actual knowledge depends upon the
circumstances in each case.21 3 The Commentary explains that the state
merely providing material or financial assistance "does not normally
assume the risk that its assistance or aid may be used" to violate
international law.214
However, in today's information age, states can be expected to be
knowledgeable of any number of reports of U.N. treaty bodies, special
procedures, country reports of other states and a plethora of reputable HR
organizations. 22115 States can also be expected to have knowledge of the
jurisprudence of the U.N. treaty bodies and regional HR courts.2 16
Therefore, "knowledge" should be assessed in light of today's widely

208. Id. art. 16 1 (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id. 3 (emphasis added).
211. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL, supra note 1,
at6.
212. Boivin, supra note 2, at 470-7 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 6.
213. Boivin, supra note 2, at 471.
214. INTERNATIONALLAw COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBLITY, supranote 136, art. 16 4.
215. Hampson, supra note 116, at 9.
216. Id.
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available sources of information regarding states' HR records, public
statements and official policies, and their propensity to commit
internationally wrongful acts.217 Given that ignorantia legis neminem
excusat is a basic principle in both criminal and civil jurisprudence, where
information is widespread that a state is either using or more likely than
not to use SALW to commit HR violations or some other internationally
wrongful act, it is reasonable to impute presumed or constructive
"knowledge" to states that export or transfer SALW.
3. Aiding or Assisting "With A View"
The Commentary to Article 16 states that aiding or assisting requires
that the "aid or assistance must be given 'with a view' to facilitating the
commission of the wrongful act, and must actually do so."28 Accordingly,
the responsibility and corresponding liability of the assisting state is
limited to those cases where the "aid or assistance given is clearly linked
to the subsequent wrongful conduct" and the aiding or assisting state
"intended" its aid or assistance "to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful
conduct and the internationally wrongful conduct is actually committed by
the aided or assisted state."219 However, "there is no requirement that the
aid or assistance" was essential to the commission of the wrongful act to
impugn secondary state responsibility.220 "It is sufficient if" its aid or
assistance "contributed significantly to that act."221
The "intent" requirement is particularly problematic with regards to
establishing state complicity of exporting or transferring states of SALW
to known HR violators when those HR do not fall within the category of
jus cogens norms or violations of lHL. A state seeking reparations carries
the burden of establishing that the exporting or transferring "state did
intend to facilitate a breach of an international obligation by another
state., 222 The intent requirement within the Commentary unduly imposes
a blanket criminal standard of proof for acts that are often more akin22to3
negligence or intentional torts requiring a much lower standard of proof.
It would also prove to be exceedingly difficult to establish intent given
that most decisions regarding the export or transfer of SALW to third states

217. Boivin, supranote 2, at 470-71.
218. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art. 16
cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Howard, supra note 3, at 23.
223. Id. (beyond a reasonable doubt versus preponderance of the evidence).
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are made by state officials and obtaining evidence of their intent to
facilitate the breach of an international obligation of another state is highly
unlikely as such intent would unlikely be "official state policy." Even if
there were evidence confirming an official policy, the documents would
most certainly be unavailable as they are likely to be classified as "state
secrets" or matters of "national security" and therefore beyond the reach of
judicial scrutiny.
The Articles were intended to be fault neutral and there is nothing in the
' The Articles
text of Article 16 requiring a showing of "wrongful intent."224
were meant to focus on the objective conduct of states not the subjective
intent of states for aiding or assisting in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act.225 In fact, a prior draft version of Article 16
was not interpreted as imposing a requirement to prove the wrongful intent
of the assisting state and there is serious doubt even with the
Commentary's chief drafter as to whether the intent requirement is
obligatory and has hinted that it may be misplaced.226 Additionally, an LC
report takes note of government suggestions to eliminate the intent
requirement from the Commentary entirely.227
Nonetheless, the author submits that given the ready availability of
today's vast, credible sources of states' HR records, public statements,
official policies, and their propensity to commit internationally wrongful
acts-such information has become common knowledge.22 Therefore,
when a state chooses to export or transfer SALW to those states, regardless
of that common knowledge, it is reasonable to presume the implied intent
of the exporting or transferring state is to aid or assist in the facilitation of
an internationally wrongful act.229 It is inconceivable that a state in today's
224. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art. 16.
225. Id. art. 2 cmts. 3, 10.
226. U.N. General Assembly, International Law Commission, Fifty-Third Session, Fourth
Report on State Responsibility, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/517/Add.1 (Apr. 3, 2000) [hereinafter
FourthReport on State Responsibility] (preparedby James Crawford) (the author is aware that art.
16's predecessor, art. 27, contained the same intent requirement as the current commentary to art.
16 however, it noted many problems in its formulation).
227. Crawford, supra note 195, at 439.
228. See Boivin, supra note 2, at 471-72; Howard, supra note 3, at 23.
229. Kate Nahapetian, ConfrontingState Complicity in InternationalLaw, 7 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 99, 127 (2002); see also Rosedale, infra note 244.
The law measures conduct by using a standard of reasonability and prudence. It
implies on the part of an actor the intent to achieve the foreseeable consequences
of an act. No volitional analysis is undertaken to see if the person actually
contemplated those results. Rather, they are imposed by implication of the
necessary state of mind.
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global information age would not have notice of another state's breach of
HR, IIHL or of the propensity for another state to commit other
internationally wrongful acts. The hierarchical status of the violated rights
in question (e.g., torture v. inhuman-degrading treatment) should be
irrelevant to the discussion of implied intent.230
Lastly, should the ILC fail to revisit the "intent" requirement mandated
within Article 16's Commentary, the author proposes that the regional HR
courts and HR quasi-judicial bodies should-under these specific
circumstances--exercise their discretion to interpret and apply Article 16
by following the fundamental rules of statutory construction and set aside
the intent requirement within the Commentary since the plain language of
the Article comes into direct conflict with it regarding its meaning.23'
Although it is necessary to determine what "knowledge" means in terms
of Article 16, such determinations should be limited to whether a state had
actual or constructive knowledge of the violating state's wrongful conduct
or the likelihood that such wrongful conduct would occur, not whether the
assisting state intended to facilitate the internationally wrongful act of a
third state. The necessity to prove the 'intent' of the assisting state should
be determined by the treaty bodies and customary law, not the Articles.
Although the Commentary can and in most cases should be viewed as
obiter dicta, the intent requirement therein is not necessarily obligatory and
in this particular case, manifestly ill-conceived and not particularly useful.
It is conceded that this would be highly controversial given the level of
deference typically bestowed upon the Commentaries of the treaty bodies.
However, setting aside the intent requirement of the Commentary by
simply applying the plain meaning of the Article (i.e., merely determining
actual or constructive "knowledge") in the instant case is justified since
unlike treaties, there is no danger that the application of the words of the
Article according to its obvious meaning will lead to a result inconsistent
with the intent or expectations of states since states have expressed their
desire for its elimination from the Commentary.232 The Articles merely
serving as a reiteration ofcustomary law, not treaty law, implies that states'
consent-that "knowledge" does not necessitate a showing of
"intent"--can be presumed since states did not insist upon the inclusion of

Id.
230. See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Thirtieth
Session, [1978] Y.B. of the ILC vol. II, pt. II, 104 (making clear "assistance" is not limited to
serious breaches of international law; secondary responsibility applies regardless of the severity of
the wrongful act).
231. INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMIssION ON STATE RESPONSIBIuTY, supra note 136, art. 16.
232. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss1/4

46

DiPerna: Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity With a View toward Exten

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: COMPLICITY "WITH A VIEW"

express language requiring both "knowledge" and "intent" within the
Article's text.233
Secondly, since the Articles are a reiteration of customary law and
thereby more akin to statutory rather than treaty law, they are subject to
various means of interpretation and although the Commentary serves a
similar function to that of a court's reliance on restatements of the law or
legislative history, it is by no means its only source. Thirdly, the drafter of
the Article's Commentary is himself in doubt of the intent requirement's
obligatory nature and its appropriateness.234 Lastly, while setting aside the
intent requirement will come into direct conflict with the Commentary,
where the meaning of the Article is clear on its face, the authoritative
statement is the Article's text and not the Article's Commentary or any
other extrinsic material.235 In light of all of the reasons set forth above, the
author submits that the authoritative value of the 'intent' requirement
within the Commentary is greatly diminished and should therefore be set
aside by the ILC and the regional HR judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.
4. Impugning Compensation to the Assisting State
It is also ill-conceived that there is a need to establish that the wrongful
act would not have occurred without the aid or assistance provided by the
assisting state in order to impugn responsibility to compensate to the
assisting state. It completely vitiates the most effective deterrent and
purposes of attributing state responsibility for states' aiding/assisting the
commission of an internationally wrongful act, namely cessation of the
wrongful act, non-repetition and holding assisting states accountable via
reparations whenever they do occur. While it is not necessary to establish
a state's aid or assistance was essential to the commission of the wrongful
act in order to establish a state's secondary responsibility, it should
correspondingly not be essential to impugn secondary liability.
Article 16 addresses both primary and secondary responsibility,
triggering both primary and secondary liability.236 Therefore, it should not
be necessary to prove the standard 'but for' test. Rather, it should only be
necessary to show that the aiding/assisting state contributed in some

233. Crawford, supra note 195.
234. See Fourth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 226.
235. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
236. See BLACK'SLAwDICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004) (defining primary liability as "liability
for which one is directly responsible, as opposed to secondary liability" and defining Secondary
Liability as "liability that does not arise unless the primarily liable party fails to honour its
obligations").
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significant way to the wrongful act in order to trigger secondary liability.2 37
It should not have to be proven that the aid or assistance in question was
essential before impugning compensation to the assisting state. This is not
to suggest that the assisting state should fully compensate for the wrongful
act itself, but rather, it should compensate in proportion to and to the extent
of the assisting state's acts or omissions contributed to the situation created
leading to the victim's harm.
Secondary compensation is essential both in terms of serving as a
deterrence and in terms of holding states responsible when they assist other
states to violate their international obligations. As discussed throughout,
given states competing interests and the tremendous economic benefit
states receive from exporting/transferring SALW, there must be some
reasonable and effective economic disincentive when states either fail to
meet their international obligations or assist others in doing so.
The Articles create new obligations for the breaching state, principally,
duties of cessation, non-repetition,238 and a duty to make full reparation.239
Article 33(1) characterizes these secondary obligations as being owed to
other states or the international community as a whole possibly indicating
that a breaching state's obligations of cessation, non-repetition, and
reparations are deemed obligations erga omnes.2 ° If this is the case, then
states have new secondary erga omnes obligations carrying with them legal
consequences not only for the violating state but also for third states.
Therefore, when states assist end-user states to violate HR rights or other
internationally wrongful acts, it is incumbent upon exporting or
transferring states to cease exporting or transferring SALW to the violating
state, prevent such exports or transfers from reoccurring and to pay
reparations as compensation for the victim's harm.
While the Commentary's language implores one to make distinctions
between criminal and civil law, it appears to conflate the two and therefore
confuses essential elements of both. Criminal law makes no distinction
between culpability of the principle offender and that of the aider or
abettor.24 However, some international wrongful acts can and often do,
include elements of both criminal and civil law, thus triggering state

237. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art 16,
cmt. 1; but see id. cmt. 5 (stating that there is "no requirement that the aid or assistance should have
been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed
significantly to that act").
238. Id. art. 30.
239. Id. art. 31.
240. Id. art. 33(1).
241. Howard, supra note 3, at 11.
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responsibilities that impugn their respective obligations and liabilities. In
these cases, states242 that aid or assist in such wrongful acts may be in
violation of: obligations erga omnes; jus cogens norms; or their primary
obligations within a given treaty none of which may differentiate between
the culpability/responsibility of the principle actor from that of the
complicit actor.243 In such cases, there may be no need to prove the fault or
intent of the aiding or assisting state or that the wrongful act would have
clearly occurred even in the absence of that state's aid/assistance. It is
enough to show that the assisting state failed to fulfill its obligations not
to facilitate the wrongful act.
Unlike criminal law, where one must prove the intent of the perpetrator
of harm, civil law liability does not always require proof of intent. For
example the tort of negligence has no intent requirement. What matters is
whether some inadvertent act or failure to act created an unreasonable risk
to another member of society. The intent of the perpetrator is completely
irrelevant. Conversely, intentional torts require proof of the perpetrator's
intent but a showing of implied intent could satisfy this requirement. Thus,
the Commentary's blanket intent requirement to establish complicity, and
its blanket requirement of direct causation to impugn compensation to the
assisting state is at best misguided. 2 "
The Commentary thus tries to reconcile its reasoning by recognizing
that specific substantive rules exist for certain wrongful acts that both
prohibit states from committing and aiding or assisting such acts by
imposing obligations on states to prevent their occurrence.245 However, this
does not explain or justify imposing a blanket intent requirement to
impugn compensation to assisting states and in fact runs counter-intuitive
to it. The Commentary adds to the confusion by stating that while these
rules do not "rely on any general principle of derived responsibility," the
rules neither confirm or deny the existence of a general principle of derived
responsibility and that it would be incorrect to deny its existence even if
one cannot articulate what the principle is based on or confirm its

242. The author is aware that states cannot commit crimes per se and is simply referring to
individuals exercising state authority on behalf of the state-state agents.
243. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 163.
244. Herbert L. Rosedale, Legal Analysis of Intent As a Continuum Emphasizing Social
Context of Volition, 6 CULTIC STUD. J. 25, 25-31 (1989) (stating "The compulsion to reach an
all-or-nothing ... answer [of intent] ignores the reality of complex or mixed motivation on the part
of actors and the importance of social values and context in reaching a legal conclusion, regardless
of the volitional capacity or desire of actors").
245. INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMIssIoN ON STATE RESPONSIBILrrY, supra note 136, art. 16,
cmt. 2 (emphasis added).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

49

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

existence . 2 ' The Commentary then ducks the issue by stating such
rationales are beyond the scope and purpose of Article 16.247
B. Articles 40 & 41
Article 41 establishes consequences of aiding/assisting a "serious
breach" of peremptory norms of general international law as proscribed by
Article 40.248 A breach is serious if it involves a "gross or systematic
failure" to fulfill international obligations.249 Under Article 41, states "have
a duty to cooperate in order to bring to an end serious breaches" although
the Article "does not prescribe in detail what form this cooperation should
take.25°
Article 41 establishes separate conditions for complicity ofjus cogens
norms and clarifies the relationship between Article 16 and Article 41:
This goes beyond the provisions dealing with aid or assistance in
the commission of an internationally wrongful act, which are
covered by Article 16... As to the elements of "aid or assistance",
article 41 is to be read in connection with article 16. In particular,
the concept of aid or assistance in article 16 presupposes that the
State has "knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act.""25
While the Commentary to Article 16 demands a showing of wrongful
intent, it appears that aid or assistance with actual or constructive
knowledge is presumed intent within jus cogens norms. 2 As discussed
throughout this Article, certain norms appear to have been widely accepted
as peremptory norms, including the basic rules of IHL.253 Thus,
exporting/transferring weapons to a state where the end-user is violating
or more likely than not will violate a jus cogens norm would be a per se
breach of Article 41(2). Going beyond Article 16, Article 41 includes
conduct "after the fact" that maintains the unlawful situation created by the

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 41 cmt. 1.
Id. art. 40; id. art. 40 cmts. 1-9.

250. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBIUTY, supra note 136, art. 41
cmt. 2.
251. Id. art. 41 cmt. 11.
252. Hampson, supra note 116, at 9.
253. See also Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 79 (July 8).
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violation, irrespective of whether the breach itself is a continuing one. 254
Thus, it is enough that a state exported/transferred SALW to a territory
where jus cogens violations are taking place to establish that the
exporting/transferring state contributed to maintaining an unlawful
situation under Article 41.

IV. CONCLUSION

As stated previously, the lack of effective international standards and
the limited means for holding states responsible for SALW transfers is
primarily due to a general lack of political will, the influence of
commercial interests and perceived geo-strategic concerns. This is in spite
of the nexus between SALW and the threat they pose to human security.
This has hindered international efforts to establish tighter controls to
improve the monitoring and regulation of the arms trade and to hold states
accountable via the development of international law. This Article has
shown that existing international law and the means for holding states
responsible for aiding or assisting other states to commit HR violations and
other internationally wrongful acts via the export or transfer of SALW are
predominately weak and ineffectual due in part to selective application and
the enforcement of international prohibitions against such transfers.
While existing measures such as binding and non-binding agreements
and codes of conduct limiting or banning the export or transfer of SALW
are an important body of norms that propose development and plans of
action representing principles that could shape or become customary law,
at present they have not been very effective at stopping or limiting the flow
of SALW to end-users that violate human rights and commit other
internationally wrongful acts. U.N. imposed embargoes' attempts to curtail
the flow of SALW to those states ranged from poor to non-existent. While
U.N. embargoes may somewhat increase the costs and difficulty in the
acquisition of SALW, additional economic disincentives are needed to
encourage states to comply with, rather than ignore embargoes. The same
is true regarding other express prohibitions on the export and transfer of
SALW under IHL and international terrorism regimes.
Additionally, the international community must seek clarification to
certain aspects of HRL. Particular clarification is needed in terms of
assessing a state's obligation to prevent the export/transfer of SALW to
known human rights violators and whether such obligations fall within its

254. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 136, art. 41

cmt. 12.
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positive duties to protect and fulfill or its negative duty to respect HR.
Further clarity is also needed regarding jurisdiction and the scope and
extraterritorial applicability of HR so that exporting or transferring states
can avoid facilitating or being complicit in HRL and IHL violations or
other internationally wrongful acts.
Under the limited circumstances where states may be deemed complicit
for exporting or transferring SALW to end-users who violate jus cogens
norms, the victims of harm must rely on their own states to seek
reparations on their behalf for the injuries they suffered. Aside from
political impracticalities that may stand in the way of the victim's state
seeking reparations from the exporting/transferring state, the heavy burden
of proof imposed by the current Articles on State Responsibility
unnecessarily adds to a complaining state's burden in seeking reparations
from exporting or transferring states when the end-user state has
committed violations other than jus cogens norms or "grave breaches" of
HR. The author has shown that it is necessary for both the ILC and
regional judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies to abandon the
intent requirement within the Commentary to Article 16 of the Articles on
State Responsibility. They should also reconsider the Commentary's
requirement to establish that a state's aid or assistance was essential to the
commission of the wrongful act in order to impugn compensation to the
assisting state.
The lack of clarity within the Articles on State Responsibility and HRL
creates a situation that allows states to export or transfer SALW to states
that are notorious HR violators, without any real risk of responsibility or
economic cost, so long as the receiving state does not use those weapons
to commit a "serious" HR violation under Article 41 or "grave breaches"
under IHL. The current state of the law is unjust and unworkable, as it
requires states to determine which human rights are likely to be violated
before exporting/transferring SALW when such distinctions often belies
reality. 5 It should make no difference whether a state engages in torture
or other HR violations with SALW, the law should prohibit
exports/transfers in both instances.
It is conceded that the law cannot solve all problems, but the
international community should maximize the law's capacity to effectively
stem the flow of SALW to end-users who are known to or more likely than
not will use SALW to commit HR violations or other internationally
wrongful acts. It is also conceded that as long as SALW are in high
255. Hampson, supra note 116, at 8-11 (criticizing attempts to create definitive categories of
conduct construed as "torture" and other conduct such as "ill-treatment" as such categories are
unworkable).
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demand, there will always be a black market waiting in the ready to try and
supplant the reduced supplies of SALW resulting from increased state
responsibility and stricter state export/transfer controls. However, where
demand is high and supplies are reduced, the cost of illicit SALW will
exponentially increase making it less affordable for violating states and
non-state actors to acquire SALW through illicit means." 6
It is well known that civil liability has shaped the behavior of private
business and major corporations for street-level behavior. Fear of civil
litigation influences the manner in which business interacts with the public.
It is conceded that the primary motivation for business is profit, whereas
states have many and often, conflicting motivations guiding their conduct.
However, the risk of financial responsibility via requiring
exporting/transferring states to compensate for being directly or indirectly
responsible for HRL, IHL, or other international law violations will at least
force states to re-assess the benefits they receive from such transfers.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the international community to use all of
the legal tools at its disposal to similarly shape and influence states'
behaviors regarding not only their decision making processes as to whether
they should export/transfer SALW to a given end-user, but also whether
they should support effective international standards regarding the
export/transfer of SALW.

256. See, e.g., Christopher Dickey, Iraq's Arms Bazaar,NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 2007, at 32,
availableat http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081307A.shtml (reporting that 9mm Glock pistols
that once cost $3,500 on the Turkish black market now only cost $500 due to some 20,000
U.S.-bought Glocks intended for Iraq having been smuggled into Turkey resulting in part from
relaxed U.S.-Iraqi SALW controls).
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